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Political Participation an Investigative Study

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

AN INVESTIGATIVE STUDY

FOR

POLS 499

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BY

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I have always been somewhat perplexed about the mechanisms of politics and more specifically, the agents of political participation. With no reservations at all, I can spit out those magical words, "I am a Conservative". However, trying to explain why becomes excruciatingly painful. I would rather reply that I am ignorant of politics altogether than try to articulate the formation of my beliefs. Nevertheless, it is a question that has peaked my interest for years and one I am determined to answer. Why is it that some people vote and others do not? What is partisanship in politics and why is it so important? How is socialization important in formulating ones beliefs? These are some of the questions I will try to answer today. I am genuinely convinced that in trying to decipher why people vote the way they do it is important to fully understand the idea of partisanship and build on that. So with that in mind let us plunge into the partisan voting practices of the United States Congress.

Congress' passage of the January 12 1991 resolution authorizing the president to use force against Iraq has been described as a unique vote of conscience, pitting liberal against liberal, conservative against conservative. While that notion has some basis in fact, analysis of the Senate vote (52-47) and the House vote (250-183), reveals familiar political patterns.

Several key features were apparent in the voting in both

chambers. First, the votes were highly partisan. In both chambers, nearly all Republicans voted to authorize the leader of their party to use force in the crisis while the great majority of Democrats (68 percent in the House, 82 percent in the Senate) voted against it. Second, the votes of Democratic members were closely related to the partisanship of their constituencies. Democrats representing districts carried by Michael Dukakis in 1988 were much less likely to support the force resolution than were Democrats representing districts carried by Bush. Third, the votes had regional overtones. Passage of the force resolution could be attributed to the support Bush commanded among members in both chambers from the South and from senators, in particular, from the Rocky Mountain West. If the decision to provide war authority to the president had been left to members from the East and Midwest, the resolution would have failed in both chambers. Southern votes were especially critical to the Senate outcome. With 14 of the 22 senators from the 11 states of the historical confederacy supporting Bush's position, the Dixie vote was decisive.

The statistical profile of a member voting for the resolution suggested a young, white male protestant representing a suburban or rural district in which he had been elected no sooner than 1980. In other words, the typical supporter was a typical Congressional Republican. A second category of typical supporter was a Southern Democrat from a district that voted heavily for Bush in 1988. Close

Leading Scorers: Party Unity

Highest Scorers — Support

Those who in 1990 most consistently voted with their party's majority against the majority of the other party:

Senate

Adams   Symms

House

Evans   Hancock

Democrats		Republicans		Democrats		Republicans	
Adams, Wash.	93%	Symms, Idaho	93%	Evans, Ill.	97%	Hancock, Mo.	98%
Gore, Tenn.	93	Burns, Mont.	92	Levin, Mich.	97	Armey, Texas	95
Leahy, Vt.	93	Nickles, Okla.	91	Hoyer, Md.	96	Burton, Ind.	95
Sarbanes, Md.	93	Hatch, Utah	89	Bonior, Mich.	95	Walker, Pa.	95
Cranston, Calif.	90	Thurmond, S.C.	89	Cardin, Md.	95	Bunning, Ky.	94
Sasser, Tenn.	90	Garn, Utah	88	Gejdenson, Conn.	95	Dreier, Calif.	94
Simon, Ill.	90	Gramm, Texas	88	Hayes, Ill.	95	Herger, Calif.	94
Dodd, Conn.	89	Helms, N.C.	88	Kildee, Mich.	95	Kyl, Ariz.	94
Kennedy, Mass.	89	Wallop, Wyo.	88	Lewis, Ga.	95	Dannemeyer, Calif.	93
Mikulski, Md.	89	Coats, Ind.	87	Moakley, Mass.	95	Moorhead, Calif.	93
Mitchell, Maine	89			Sabo, Minn.	95	Paxon, N.Y.	93
Moynihan, N.Y.	89			Studds, Mass.	95	Sensenbrenner, Wis.	93
				Vento, Minn.	95		
				Wheat, Mo.	95		

Highest Scorers — Opposition

Those who in 1990 most consistently voted against their party's majority:

Senate

Heflin   Jeffords

House

Stenholm   Conte

Democrats		Republicans		Democrats		Republicans	
Heflin, Ala.	46%	Jeffords, Vt.	61%	Stenholm, Texas	47%	Conte, Mass.	71%
Shelby, Ala.	41	Hatfield, Ore.	58	Parker, Miss.	46	Horton, N.Y.	66
Boren, Okla.	34	Cohen, Maine	53	Hutto, Fla.	44	Morella, Md.	65
Exon, Neb.	34	Packwood, Ore.	53	Taylor, Miss.	43	Gilman, N.Y.	63
Breaux, La.	31	Heinz, Pa.	47	Hall, Texas	41	Green, N.Y.	60
Dixon, Ill.	30	Specter, Pa.	46	Jacobs, Ind.	41	Schneider, R.I.	57
Ford, Ky.	30	Durenberger, Minn.	40			Smith, N.J.	54
Johnston, La.	29	Chafee, R.I.	36			Boehlert, N.Y.	52
Baucus, Mont.	28						

THE ELECTORATE EXAMINED

In this year's elections for the House of Representatives, familiar voting tendencies of groups played themselves out. Voting patterns for the last four off-year elections are shown below.

CBS/NYT 1978

Question: Who did you vote for in the election for U.S. House of Representatives?

■ Voted for Democratic candidate ▨ Republican ⬚ Other

	Democratic	Republican	Other
All voters	55%	43%	2%
By party			
Democrat	81%	18%	1%
Republican	13%	86%	1%
Independent	51%	45%	4%
By ideology			
Liberal	74%	23%	3%
Conservative	38%	60%	2%
Moderate	60%	38%	2%
By sex			
Men	55%	42%	3%
Women	56%	43%	1%
By race			
White	53%	45%	2%
Black	81%	16%	3%
Hispanic	60%	38%	2%
Union household	66%	32%	2%
By age			
18-29	60%	36%	4%
30-44	55%	43%	2%
45-59	55%	43%	2%
60+	53%	46%	1%
By household income previous year			
Less than $10,000	62%	35%	3%
$10,000-$15,000	58%	40%	2%
$15,001-$25,000	56%	42%	2%
Over $25,000	45%	53%	2%

Note: Sample = 8,933 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News. November 7, 1978.

CBS/NYT 1982

Question: In the election for U.S. House of Representatives in this district, who did you just vote for?

■ Voted for Democratic candidate ▨ Republican ⬚ Other

	Democratic	Republican	Other
All voters	55%	43%	2%
By party			
Democrat	88%	11%	1%
Republican	13%	86%	1%
Independent	50%	46%	4%
By ideology			
Liberal	72%	24%	3%
Conservative	37%	60%	3%
Moderate	59%	40%	1%
By sex			
Men	54%	44%	2%
Women	57%	41%	2%
By race			
White	53%	45%	2%
Black	80%	18%	2%
Hispanic	61%	29%	10%
Union members	68%	31%	1%
By age			
18-29	61%	38%	1%
30-44	52%	46%	2%
45-59	56%	42%	2%
60+	56%	42%	2%
By household income previous year			
Less than $10,000	70%	28%	2%
$10,000-$19,999	59%	39%	2%
$20,000-$29,999	59%	40%	1%
$30,000-$50,000	46%	49%	4%
Over $50,000	36%	64%	*

Note: Sample size = 5,785 voters in opposed districts as they left voting booths. * = less than .5%.
Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times. November 2, 1982.

Comparing Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics

Compared to whites and blacks, Hispanics are more upbeat about the present course of the country, the job the president is doing, and at least relatively, the job Congress is doing.

VOTERS

	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics
Approve of Bush's job	59%	31%	61%
Disapprove	38%	65%	37%
Approve of Congress's job	19%	28%	34%
Disapprove	77%	63%	59%

Abortion should be ...

	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics
Legal in all circumstances	39%	39%	30%
Only some	44%	40%	47%
Illegal	14%	16%	19%

Consider self ...

	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics
Democrat	34%	73%	50%
Republican	35%	12%	27%
Independent	27%	10%	20%

Country on ...

	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics
Right track	40%	23%	50%
Wrong track	56%	73%	44%

Issues that mattered the most

	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics
Environment	23%	13%	18%
Education	25%	44%	39%
Crime/drugs	21%	37%	38%
Iraq	6%	5%	5%
Abortion	15%	9%	9%
S&Ls	4%	3%	1%

In Texas

	Gov. vote	Party ID
Dem.	67%	57%
Rep.	28	19
Ind	–	20

In Calif.

	Gov. vote	Party ID
Dem.	51%	59%
Rep.	45	16
Ind	–	21

behind party as a predictor of members January 12 votes was race. Of the 25 voting members of the House who are black, only freshman Gary Franks, R-Conn., voted for the resolution. Among Hispanic and Asian Americans, the vote was nearly as lopsided. Of the 15 Hispanic of Asian Americans voting in the two chambers, only three supported Bush.

If party and race are usually reliable predictors of voting behavior, some of the elements of the January 12 division were more surprising in their effect. Among these were the members characteristics of age, seniority and religion. In the Senate, in fact, age was a huge factor. Altogether, of the 29 senators born before 1930, only nine voted in favor of the resolution. And only one of the very oldest half-dozen senators, those born before 1920, voted in favor. Bush's war resolution was far more popular among younger members. Baby boomers, those born between 1946 and 1964, supported Bush by a 3 to 2 ratio. Seniority seemed to produce a similar pattern. Reluctance to authorize force seemed to increase with seniority. In the House, amnong the 164 members voting who had been sworn in before 1981, the measure barely prevailed(84-80). Conversely, among those sworn in since 1980, Bush won backing by fat margins in both chambers, including a 25-19 vote of support among House freshmen and a 3-1 vote of support among Senate freshmen.

The vote also showed notable divisions between members along religious lines. The most willing to back Bush were those who identify themselves with a Protestant church.

Among Catholics, by contrast, support for the war fell just below 50 percent in the Senate and below 36 percent in the House. An even more noteable result by religion was the near even split among Jewish members. Bush's resolution failed among Jewish members by a score of 16-17 in the House and 3-5 in the Senate. This was surprising because the crisis is generally viewed as a threat to Israel.

In all, Republican support for the president's position could hardly have been more complete. All but three of the 167 House Republicans (98 percent) voted for force, as did all but two of the 44 GOP members in the Senate(95 percent). Now that we more fully understand the magnitude of partisanship we can begin to look at some of the factors and values that cause it and come into play when we go to the ballot box.

Demographics plays a very important role in partisanship. Let us now turn to an example of changes in Partisanship by Demographic groups. In the 1950's the simple fact of being a Southerner was sufficient reason for most to identify as Democrats; many had been born into the Democratic party in much the same way they had been born into a given church. Their political identity was overwhelmingly defined by where they lived, as opposed to who they were in terms of religion, social status, etc. In contrast, comparable data from the 1980 Super Tuesday study show many significant relationships in the new South, which now virtually match those in the rest of the country. The most important 1988

pattern is that of age. The fact that citizens under 30 are by far the most Republican whereas those over 65 are the most Democratic should benefit the GOP for a generation to come, as population replacement takes its toll.

Another aspect of the New Deal party system which made little imprint on the old South was the role of social status, as measured by either family income or education. The Democrats in the old South were "the symbol of small town, middle-class respectability." Thus in the 1950's low income and a grade school education actually decreased the likelihood of Democratic identification among white southerners in the 1950's.

As the South industrialized socioeconomic patterns of partisanship came to resemble those of the North. 16 percent of white southerners who belonged to a union household in the 1950's were slightly more likely to be Democrats. By 1988 this unionized group had declined to 9 percent, but the difference in partisanship compared to the rest of the population had increased greatly. As the South has moved beyond industrialization to high technology, increasing education and income levels have substantially contributed to the GOP gains. The middle and upper middle income categories are now major sources of Republican strength. As grade school educated citizens have dwindled, this aging remnant of the old South has gone from the least to the most Democratic of the education categories. In contrast, among college graduates a 54 percent advantage for the Democrats in the

1950's has been transformed into a 31 percent edge for the
Republicans in 1988. This example of the Southern states is
a clear indication of the power that Partisanship plays on
voting behavior and party affiliation. Further, this example
clearly illustrates that those individuals who are young,
well educated and have money identify more closely with the
Republican party. Now let us turn to another example of
Partisan shifts which is a little closer to home.

Illinois is a classic example of split-level politics.
The Democrats have not carried Illinois in a presidential
election since 1964. And they have'nt won a contest for
governor since 1972. Yet Democrats occupy both U.S. Senate
seats and have held a majority of House seats since 1982.
Democrats took control of both state legislative houses in
1974 and have held them for all but two years since.

Realignment shows up most clearly in Chicago. White
ethnics are less Democratic than they used to be, while
blacks and liberals are more Democratic. Blacks in Illinois
went from about three-quarters Democratic in the 1950's to
over 90 percent in the decades since. Chicago's white ethnic
voters have moved in the opposite direction. Their support
for the Democratic ticket dropped to 50 percent in the
1960's, rose in the 1970's, then collapsed during the Reagan
years. These are the White Democratic "regulars" who gave
John Kennedy 62 percent of their vote. They gave Walter
Mondale 37 percent, and Michael Dukakis 44 percent, thus
costing him Illinois.

The "lakefront liberal" vote-educated, upper-middle
class whites on the north side moved in the opposite
direction. Lakefront liberals and white ethnics clash over
cultural politics. Like blacks, white liberals became more
Democratic in the 1960's as white ethnics became less
Democratic. In the 1970's the Democrats picked up support
from white ethnics and lost ground among lakefront liberals.
The return of cultural politics in the 1980's brought
educated liberals back to the Democratic party and drove
white ethnics away. Chicago's growing hispanic vote now
holds the balance of power in city elections. Hispanics vote
more like blacks than like white ethnics. But the trend in
the hispanic vote during the 1980's is like that of white
ethnics- anti Democratic.

One reason why realignment seems to be a Chicago
phenomenon is Chicago's recent history of racial politics.
In his two mayoral victories (1983 and 1987), Harold
Washington took almost all of the black vote but less than 10
percent of the white ethnic vote. Nevertheless, the
polarization of Chicago politics began long before the
1980's. It started with the cultural clashes of the 1960's.
Even while Richard J. Daley held the Democratic organization
vote together in mayoral elections, racial and ideological
divisions were becoming stronger in national and state
voting. The downstate voters were unaffected by realignment,
consistently voting in the low 40s for Democratic
presidential tickets, in the high 40s for statewide

Democrats. Similarly, suburban whites have voted in the low
30s for presidential Democrats, in the high 30s for statewide
Democrats.

But that continuity disguises important demographic
shifts. Illinois is divided into 3 geographic components:
Chicago, the suburbs, and downstate. During the 1950's,
Chicago accounted for about 40 percent of the Illinois vote.
Today, it is 25 percent. The suburban share of the vote has
mushroomed from 22 to 36 percent. The downstate vote has
remained stable while Chicago's percentage of the state total
vote has gotten smaller, it has also gotten more Democratic
(from 60 percent Democratic in the 1950's to about 70 percent
today). While the Republican vote in the suburbs has
remained stable (about 60 percent), that vote has more weight
today. These two changes have altered Illinois' politics.

By the 1960's, the suburban vote offset the Chicago vote
with equal numbers of voters. Chicago voted 63 percent
Democratic, the suburbs 61 percent Republican. Downstate
Illinois cast the swing vote-usually narrowly Republican. By
the 1980's, the suburban vote was much larger than the
Chicago vote. Even though Democrats regularly come out of
Chicago these days with a 400,000 vote edge, they can get
swamped in the suburbs-which is what happens in presidential
elections.

In sum, realignment has solidified a liberal Democratic
base in Chicago. Realignment has also swelled the size of
the Republican vote in the suburbs. White ethnics did not

just move out of the Democratic party. They also moved out of the city, and ended up voting just as Republican as their neighbors. It used to be the case that Republicans carried Illinois by cutting into the big Chicago vote. Now Democrats carry Illinois by cutting into the big suburban and downstate vote. We have talked thus far about Partisanship and how changes in Partisanship effect voting behavior. What I would like to do now is move our focus to some of the different factors that come into play when we go to the ballot box and discuss why they are a driving force in determining why some people vote and others do not.

The central finding of survey-level studies of contemporary American voter turnout is that formal education is the most powerful predictor of voting. The more education a person has, the more likely he is to vote. This finding results from national studies; however, virtually no research has been conducted to determine whether this pattern of participation exists within the individual states.

There is good reason to expect that the pattern of voter participation many well vary from one state to the next. An examination of the "theory" of voter participation implicit in much of the research on American voter turnout suggests the basis for this expectation. According to this theory, an individual is likely to vote if the motivation to vote exceeds the obstacles to voting. Sources of motivation may be internal or external. "Internal" sources of motivation include such attitudes as partisan identification, "political

Gender and Education Comparisons

Women who went to the polls were less likely to approve of the job the president is doing and more negative about the country's direction than men who turned out. Those with the least and those with the most formal education tend to differ on a wide range of issues.

VOTERS	Men	Women	Some H.S.	Postgraduate
Approve of Bush's job	58%	53%	37%	43%
Disapprove	36%	40%	60%	53%
Approve of Congress's job	17%	22%	19%	17%
Disapprove	76%	70%	73%	80%
Abortion should be ...				
Legal in all circumstances	38%	41%	26%	53%
Only some	46%	41%	46%	37%
Illegal	14%	15%	23%	9%
Consider self ...				
Democrat	32%	39%	48%	35%
Republican	34%	31%	27%	34%
Independent	27%	23%	21%	29%
Ideology				
Liberal	18%	20%	17%	22%
Conservative	35%	28%	35%	30%
Moderate	41%	46%	38%	47%
Country on ...				
Right track	42%	35%	32%	43%
Wrong track	51%	57%	61%	53%
Issues that mattered the most				
Environment	22%	23%	14%	28%
Education	22%	31%	19%	35%
Crime/drugs	23%	22%	29%	17%
Iraq	7%	5%	4%	5%
Abortion	9%	19%	11%	14%
S&Ls	5%	3%	4%	4%

efficacy", "sense of civic duty", and "political trust". The strong association between such attitudes and voting was established in the early voting studies and has been frequently confirmed. "External" sources of motivation are electoral activities, i.e., the voter registration and get out and vote efforts of candidates, parties, and other organizations. That electoral activities can foster participation has been attested to in a variety of research contexts. Survey research at various levels of elections has shown that persons contacted by candidate and party volunteers are more likely to vote than persons not contacted. County and precinct studies have demonstrated that the mobilization efforts of candidates and party organizations can stimulate turnout. Recent studies also indicate that campaign spending levels, utilized as indicators of electoral mobilization effort, are positively associated with turnout levels in state and congressional elections. Finally, several authors have concluded that electoral or party competition, seen as a stimulus to electoral activity, fosters voter participation.

The primary obstacles to voting are voter registration laws, which evidence suggests are best viewed as barriers citizens must overcome in order to vote. Comparitive, historical, and cross-sectional studies have reached this conclusion. Comparitive researchers have found that low turnout rates in the United States, relative to Western Europe, can be explained at least partially in terms of

American State registration requirements. Research has
demonstrated that the introduction of personal registration
laws around the turn of the century clearly had a depressing
effect on turnout levels. Turnout studies have consistently
found that restrictive registration laws lower voter turnout
rates. Researchers have concluded that voter registration
laws are particularly severe obstacles to voting for persons
with little or no formal education. Given the unequal
effects of registration laws as obstacles to voting and the
variation in state registration laws, it follows that one
would expect the turnout gap between the more educated and
the less educated to be greater in states with more
restrictive registration laws than states with less
restrictive laws.

A quite different theory which deals with why people do
and do not vote is the amount of integration into community
life each voter has. More precisely, this theory holds that
voting participation, beyond all other factors, will be
higher among persons who are more fully integrated into their
communities, finding satisfaction in the community life.

The direction of the vote - Republican or Democratic -
can be explained as a seeking of benefits, however general.
In this sense, voting does appear to be rational, a logical
consequence of partisan loyalties, of issue preferences, and
of candidate evaluation. The costs of making a correct
choice are sensibly reduced when voters use cues such as
partisanahip.

When deciding whether to vote at all, however, voters
are more likely to emphasize costs that are immediate (time,
obtaining information, finding the polling place, etc.),
while the benefits are distant at best. The chance that one
vote will make a difference is so astronomical that it cannot
be worth the effort on purely rational grounds of costs and
benefits. Indeed, on this basis, it is difficult to
understand why anyone would vote at all in an election larger
than a rural high school contest.

For the current study, five individual attitudes were
examined: strwength of partisanship, external efficacy,
internal efficacy, interest in the campaign, and citizen
duty. It stands to reason that people are more likely to
vote if they are strongly committed to a political party, if
they find the world of politics responsive, understandable,
and interesting, and if they accept the conventional cicic
obligation to vote. All of these attitudes showed
consistent, though varied, relationships to turnout in the
elections of 1984 and 1988. These attitudes were also found
to be helpful in explaining a notable decline in strong
partisanship during this period, as well as a decided decline
in external efficacy and a possible decline in citizen duty.

Measuring the impact of two of these factors -
partisanship and external efficacy - Ruy Teixeira found that
they accounted for 38 percent of the drop in turnout from
1960 to 1980. Conversely, he found these two factors
accounted for 46 percent of the increase in turnout between

1980 to 1984. Still, the puzzle is not completely solved.
We need to look beyond these individualistic causes. These
explanations, however, leave something out; they leave out
the local flavor of an election and its social character.

Urban machines brought voters to the polls not only
because voters were paid for their ballots, but because
voting was an expression of the voters integration into a
local, typically ethnic, network of personal associations. A
noted political scientist, George Washington Plunkitt,
illustrated the connection between political participation,
in this case in Fourth of July celebrations and community
identity. "When the Fourth of July comes, the reformers,
with Revolutionary names parted in the middle, run off to
Newport or the Adirondacks to get out of the way of the noise
and everything that reminds them of the glorious day. How
different it is with Tammany! The very constitution of the
Tammany Society requires that we must assemble at the wigwam
on the Fourth, regardless of the weather, and listen to the
reading of the Declaration of Independence and patriotic
speeches".

The focus of this theory is the integration of voters
into their communities. This integration is achieved as
close face to face relationships in three contexts: the
family, the residential community, and peer groups. Family,
residence, and group affiliations are viewed as different
aspects of the social correctedness of individuals, as some
of the ways in which they separate themselves from the

"lonely crowd", and become part of active political networks.

To test the relationship of community integration to turnout, eight variables that provide reasonably appropriate measures of integration into individuals immediate social surroundings, and of their committment to their communities. In contrast to psychological attitudes, we will deal here with actual behavior. The first variable – being married – represents a personal committment to the small community of the family. This theory expects a higher turnout among married people. A similar committment would be evidenced by raising children.

Three other variables represent committment to the residential community. We should expect higher turnout among persons who own, rather than rent, their homes; and who have lived longer in their current home. The final four variables represent committment to group communities. We should expect higher turnout among persons who are more frequent churchgoers; who come from families with union members; who discuss politics frequently; and who belong to or take part in formal organizations of those people to whom they feel closest. For example, a religious group for those who feel closest to their coreligionsists.

Changes in the distribution of these characteristics among the national population can help explain the decline in national turnout. Teixeira, the leading analyst of these changes, points to the significant increase in unmarried adults and in residential mobility among Americans as major

Other Groups

Exit pollsters gave voters a list of groups and asked if they identified with them. Three are shown below. Using this approach, we can examine groups whose numbers are usually too small for analysis. Self-described gays and lesbians, for example, are pessimistic about the country's direction, anti-Bush, and strongly Republican.

VOTERS	Attend religious services at least once a month	Labor union members	Gays/Lesbians
Approve of Bush's job	63%	49%	20%
Disapprove	34%	49%	78%
Approve of Congress's job	19%	20%	15%
Disapprove	75%	76%	43%
Abortion should be ...			
Legal in all circumstances	27%	43%	47%
Only some	50%	42%	52%
Illegal	21%	13%	1%
Consider self ...			
Democrat	33%	48%	27%
Republican	39%	21%	51%
Independent	25%	28%	18%
Ideology			
Liberal	15%	23%	74%
Conservative	38%	29%	4%
Moderate	45%	46%	20%
Country on ...			
Right track	42%	39%	19%
Wrong track	54%	59%	81%
Issues that mattered the most			
Environment	20%	23%	68%
Education	28%	32%	11%
Crime/drugs	23%	25%	9%
Iraq	7%	6%	45%
Abortion	18%	13%	13%
S&Ls	3%	5%	2%

Note: Voters were asked, "Are you any of the following (check as many as apply): first time voter, retired, married, currently employed, member of a labor union, attend religious services at least once a month, strong feminist, have an immediate family member in the armed forces/reserves, gay or lesbian?"
Source: Survey by Voter Research and Surveys, November 6, 1990.

factors, accounting for almost 18 percent of the drop in voting participation. It is clearly evident that community integration has a definite impact on voter turnout.

Through the course of this essay I have identified numerous theories, values, and ideals which relate strongly to voter participation in the electorate. I have studied the principles of partisanship and socialization, and through specific case studies proved that they have a controlling influence on voting behavior. Finally, I have analyzed a number of shifts in partisanship and voting behavior and shown how this effects the overall makeup of the electorate. I feel that because of my intensive study, my grasp of the different agents which effect political participation is much firmer. It is my genuine concern that the reader feels likewise.

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