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Who's Leading Whom: Leadership PAC Networks through the Republican Era of Congress

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Cash Flows: Leadership PACs in the U. S. Congress from 1992-2008

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Abstract

The Republican leadership in the U.S. Congress pursued aggressive strategies of partisan discipline from 1994-2006, during which they held the majority of seats in the House of Representatives. Anecdotally, the Republican leadership built tight donor networks, demanding and rewarding partisan loyalty from rank and file elected officials. This paper uses Social Network Analysis to explore the structure of those relationships over time and compare them to the Democrats. Specifically, I examine campaign donations from and between leadership political action committees in the U.S. Congress from 1992-2008.

1. Introduction

Political parties in the United States have never been considered ideologically cohesive, particularly when compared to other party systems [2][8][12]. The primary goal of every legislator is re-election; pursuing ideological goals do not further reelection as much as credit-claiming, advertising and position-taking [19]. American legislators create personal re-election constituencies to insulate themselves from party pressures [5][17]. Incumbents are particularly well-suited to protecting themselves from partisan and electoral pressure [13]. Finally, office-seekers in the United States must organize and finance their own campaigns, largely independent of the political parties – leading to candidate-centered, rather than party-centered campaigns [17]. Political parties are instrumental tools that ambitious politicians use to achieve goals related to re-election, gaining institutional power and affecting policy [1].

In effect, members of Congress face a collective action dilemma. To attain office and remain there, they must act as individuals. To achieve collective goals, they must form coalitions. While few mechanisms for party discipline exist, the promise of campaign funds, intra-party power and majority status can provide

incentives for legislators to coordinate behavior. Campaign finance laws regarding political action committees (PACs) give politicians the opportunity to advance individual goals of re-election and intra-party power, as well as the collective goal of majority status, or control of the institution. In addition, the law allows elected officials to raise money outside their campaign organizations via “leadership PACs” to assist other candidates and organizations [21].

When the Republican party gained majority status with the 1994 election, its leadership used campaign finance laws and institutional rules to demand and reward partisan loyalty, especially under the leadership of Tom DeLay. While this analysis does not address questions of causality, it does explore and describe the changing structure of leadership PAC networks for both parties from 1992-2008. I find that the Republicans are first to establish connectivity among their leadership PACs, while Democrats tend to take advantage of the larger party structure to distribute campaign cash. Specifically, the Republicans created a core-periphery structure, while the Democrats developed a more balanced network. Finally, some evidence exists to confirm prior research on member PAC giving strategies with respect to individual and collective aspirations.

2. Why give?

Running for federal office is expensive. The high cost of elections and historical evidence of corruption led to the regulation of campaign finances in federal elections, including the U.S. House and Senate. Much of the law revolves around regulating contributions and expenditures and providing transparency through disclosure laws. Many organizations, including banks, corporations and labor unions, are prohibited from donating directly to campaigns; they are permitted to do so via separate entities called political action committees (PACs). PACs must be funded separately from the general treasury through voluntary contributions. Finally, PACs are limited in the amount




Figure 1. Leadership PAC growth

they can spend on candidates, political parties, and one another [9][21].

Leadership (or member) PACs are a subset of political action committees, governed by the same campaign finance laws governing traditional PACs. Instead of being affiliated with business, labor or civic organizations, elected officials (and former ones) create and chair these committees, which are legally distinct entities from their respective campaign committees and the political parties. The widespread use of leadership PACs is a relatively recent institutional development [16][26]. Since the early 1990s, the number of member PACs exploded, reaching 458 in 2008 (Figure 1). Republican officials led the way in creating these committees, consistently outpacing Democratic politicians.

Member PACs may distribute their wealth to many different types of organizations, *not just candidates*. In fact, a committee could make a direct contribution to a candidate (up to \$10,000 per two-year electoral cycle), to the national party (up to \$30,000 per cycle), the state party (\$5000) and any other PACs (\$5000 each, annually), *on top of what the candidate committee can contribute* [21]. Leadership PACs provide a way for redistributing fundraising wealth from safe, well-funded legislators to challengers and competitive races [10][11][25].

Academic research on PACs spending and influence is divided on the actual purpose of cash and its influence on policy outcomes; most ascertain that contributions either buy policy influence or political access, with about half the literature concluding contributions have no direct influence [3][18]. Influence or access may not be a direct goal of a PAC contribution. More accurately, a PAC contribution helps maintain (re-elect) or expand (support challengers) a favorable coalition of legislators with similar policy preferences. Prior research suggests that leadership PACs are strategic, supporting quality challengers and vulnerable incumbents. Members owning these PACs may have both collective and

individual goals in mind when distributing funds [11][25].

The primary goal of all members of Congress is reelection, followed by power within the institution and good public policy; they are able achieve these goals through credit-claiming, advertising and position-taking [19] and taking advantage of the perks of in being office to establish a personal, as opposed to partisan, connection with their voters [5][13]. Achieving stature within the institution, such as advancing in the leadership or committee structures of Congress can advance these goals. In addition, legislators build alliances to pass legislation that helps their individual districts. Thus, members of Congress contribute from their leadership PACs to improve their individual standing within their respective party and within the chamber as a whole. In doing so, they enhance individual electoral prospects. Legislators desiring advancement should contribute to the party leaders who then redistribute funds to the races where most needed. Members who want to build alliances will be more likely to contribute to other member PACs, regardless of the rank of the member. While the leadership PAC retains direct control when donating to a candidate, it looks magnanimous and expansive when it donates to the other entities.

Collective goals, such as achieving majority control and passing programmatic legislation, require coordination among individuals. Parties evolved within the Congress to maintain more or less permanent coalitions of individuals who share similar preferences. One way for a party to improve cohesion is to elect more politicians who share party objectives. More specifically, prior research argues that party leaders tend to sponsor the largest committees, play a role in targeting races and exhorting their members to do the same [26]. The leadership of each party may use leadership PACs to enforce party discipline, forge coalitions and reward good behavior. Thus, collective goals of the parties would include maintenance, expansion, and party-building. Thus, we would expect party leadership to contribute their funds to targeted races that would help maintain or gain control and to serve as brokers, connecting those with funds to those in need.

Individual goals are intertwined with collective goals of majority power and control of the chamber. Majority status confers additional perks including setting the agenda and committee chairmanships both of which can be tailored to fit constituent needs and achieve policy goals [13]. Simply, majority status, a collective goal, helps politicians achieve individual goals related to advancement.

Campaign finance law, together with collective and individual needs of legislators, creates the

possibility for networks to develop, reflecting the flow of resources from one fundraiser to another. Naturally, some members can afford to be expansive – or generous – particularly those with safe seats, national reputations, or existing leadership status. Others will endeavor to create funding ties with one another in support of future legislative or electoral goals, such as presidential ambitions. The party organizations themselves will likely serve as conduits, redistributing funds where needed.

3. Methods and data

Elected officials own leadership PACs. They have control over the funds raised and distributed. While they may be pressured from the legally separate political party organizations (i.e., the Republican or Democratic National Committees), financial decisions remain within the member PAC, not the party. Elected officials use leadership PACs to raise money separate from their campaign committees; successful fundraising may raise a member's prestige or status, help increase a party's seat share, and could be used to enforce party discipline. However, contributions do not always flow from a member committee directly to a candidate. A member PAC may give to another leadership PAC or another political organization, including parties, ideological PACs and business-related PACs, who may then be in a position to redistribute the funds.

Social Network Analysis (SNA) allows one to examine the relationships between actors. SNA enables one to uncover who the prominent actors may be, how entities are connected with one another and relative power within a particular context. Moreover, SNA also allows one to understand the structure of those relationships – or the overall context of the relationships. Campaign contributions are a classic form of transaction relation, where the cash from one member to another constitutes a valued, directed tie. In addition, the contribution also communicates information about both the giver and the receiver. Thus, SNA is an appropriate technique to understand the structure of giving within leadership PACs in Congress and can improve our understanding of relationships in Congress, as they are explicitly modeled. Here, I make use of the valued and directed properties that contributions inherently communicate.

Federal elections for the House and Senate are governed by a two-year cycle corresponding to the elections that occur for Congress. Thus, the election occurring in 1992 would include the year prior as part of its cycle (e.g., 1991-92 is the 1992 cycle). I examine leadership PAC contribution patterns for each cycle

from 1992-2008, or nine cycles. The total cash contributions from one member PAC to another PAC in a single two-year cycle creates the tie for a single election; the combination of those ties between the varying member PACs creates the network for that cycle. I use the total dollar amount from one committee to another in a cycle rather than the number of contributions to weight the edges, under the assumption that receiving more money is more important and constitutes a stronger relationship. The ties are directed, indicated that the donor chose the recipient, which has meaning in terms of collective and individual goals.

Leadership PACs give almost exclusively to fellow partisans. Thus, each party is examined independently. Moreover, the networks do not necessarily contain the same set of actors over time, reflecting electoral fortunes of politicians, this makes true dynamic modeling problematic [22][23]. The data come from the Center for Responsive Politics' bulk or "open data" for PAC to PAC contributions [7]. I first examine within-member PAC giving. I then examine leadership PAC giving to other political action committees and the national, state and local parties.

4. Sharing the cash among themselves

How do leadership PACs share funds with each other? Examining within-leadership committee contributions can illustrate the structure of relationships, including who, if anyone is influential, and how well the leadership PACs are connected. Having a leadership PACs may signify a desire for higher office, staying an incumbent, or passage of policy priorities – individualistic goals related to advancement. Sharing hard earned cash from your leadership committee, or developing exchange relationships with other leadership committees, requires overcoming the collective action problem. Individuals must move beyond individualist aims to advance collective goals of majority status. Thus, members may pursue goals of advancement and alliances, but may also pursue maintenance, expansion and party-building activity. The network of within-member PAC giving can highlight these relationships, particularly those of advancement.

In this section, I examine the digraphs from 1992 to 2008 for both parties' Congressional leadership PACs. Circles indicate House members, squares indicate Senators. The sizes of the nodes indicate betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality is important in the context of PAC giving, as betweenness allows one to assess the location of actors and their roles. An actor with high betweenness




Figure 2. Democratic leadership PACs 2004

centrality has more influence over the flow of money in the network, connecting disparate elements of the network [15]. I use spring-embedding with geodesic distances to configure the digraphs. In the figures below, I do not show the edge weights to improve readability. Interestingly, neither party exhibits much in the way of ties or structure early. The most connected networks occur for the Republicans in the early 2000s, at the height of Republican fundraising prowess.

4.1. Democrats and presidential ambition

The Democratic leadership PACs networks are slow to organize. The first four networks (92, 94, 96, 98) average 2.5 actors and 1.5 ties; no exchanges take place in 1994. The last four cycles (02, 04, 06, 08) average 32 actors and 26.5 ties. The networks are small, to be sure, but much more developed in more recent electoral cycles.

Not until the 2004 election does any real connectivity occur within the Democratic committee network (Figure 2). This network consists of both House and Senate member PACs, with Tom Daschle, Nancy Pelosi and Patrick Kennedy anchoring a small, simple network. Interestingly, the direction of ties suggests that House members are assisting Senators in 2004. Daschle, the highest ranking Democrat in the Senate has an equal number of ties in either direction. This would be consistent with the idea that party leaders funnel money to those most in electoral need or with collective goals of attaining or protecting majority status.

In 2002, Representative Pelosi served as Minority Leader, or leader of the opposition party in the House (then Democratic). In that cycle, she contributes to other House members with relative safe seats, potential evidence of alliance-building, individual goals. However, since this network only consists of other incumbents with leadership PACs, I cannot rule out




Figure 3. Republican leadership PACs 2002

party building. Pelosi's presence from 2002-2006 presage her rise to leadership within House Democratic ranks; she won the Speakership, the highest office with the House, in 2007. More often than not, she is distributing, contributions consistent with ambition.

In 2008, two of the three actors with the most betweenness centrality are Senators with presidential aspirations (Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden). In addition, both contenders for the Democratic Presidential nomination are recipients, not donors. The ties related to presidential hopefuls indicate a different type of strategy than discussed above, suggesting more theorizing about inter-institutional ambition. For example, if a legislator wanted to run for higher office, such as the presidency, then she would want to build a coalition of support prior to doing so. Giving money to colleagues, or being expansionist for some time prior to a presidential bid, would build support for this ambition that could be called upon during the election. This is not evident in any of the within member PAC networks for Senator Hillary Clinton. In all cases, she attracts contributions from her fellow members, suggesting support for her potential bid already exists. It is also evidence of her ability to raise funds even as a newcomer to the Senate. By 2003 she had already surpassed President Bill Clinton as the Democratic Party's leading fundraiser [6]. Giving to prominent presidential hopefuls might be considered the ultimate in party-building behavior: it helps capture a different institution for the party.

4.2. Republicans coordinate, then collapse

The Republicans are much quicker to begin the flow of money across leadership PACs and exhibit much more cohesiveness in the digraphs. Prior to 2000, the Republican graphs are quite similar to the Democrats, though larger: from 1992-1998, each network averages 8.75 actors and 5.75 ties. This period coincides with the Republicans gaining control of both




Figure 4. Republican leadership PACs 2006

chambers of the U.S. Congress, and attempting to maintain party discipline (1995-98). The networks for the last four electoral cycles are much larger than prior periods or than any of the Democratic networks, averaging 85.75 actors and 118.75 ties from 2002-2008.

Like the Democrats, the early cycles consist mainly of small, disconnected groups. It is not until 2000 that any connectivity between separate components of these early networks appears. In addition, the Republican leadership PAC network is at its height only from 2000-2006. The member PAC network exhibits fragmentation in 2006, which is much more apparent in 2008. In 2008, when the Republicans no longer controlled either the House or the Senate, the size of their network was nearly half what it was in 2006, with a third the number of ties. This could reflect any number of things: the loss seats, and consequent loss of majority, the splintering of relationships within the Republican Party, or a change of financial strategy within the leadership.

The Republican network for 2002 reveals interesting patterns (Figure 3). Two former legislators have high betweenness centrality (Livingston and Paxon). This gives them positional advantage, in that they can help resources flow from one part of the network to another. Former members often maintain their Leadership PACs for some time after leaving office. As neither individual has individual electoral or advancement ambitions within Congress, they are clearly pursuing collective goals, including expansion and party-building. In particular, Livingston could afford to be expansionist: he retired in early 1999.

The 2006 electoral cycle, which cost the Republicans majority status in both chambers, reveals the beginning of what appears to be separation by chamber (Figure 4), Senators McConnell and Stevens anchor the Senate side, while Representative Blunt exhibits the highest betweenness centrality on the House (left) side. This would indicate the possibility that these legislators were engaging in party-building




Figure 5. Republican leadership PACs 2008

and a rear guard strategy – to protect majority status within each chamber. However, rather than coordinating across chambers as in the past, the giving within leadership PACs is more within chamber, perhaps to serve collective goals of maintaining control.

Evidence for both collective and individual goals is present. Neither McConnell nor Stevens was up for re-election, thus could afford to be generous. For most of the electoral cycle, the Republicans were expected to maintain control of the Senate. McConnell would have benefited as he was expected to become the leader of the Senate had that happened. Nearly all of his ties are as contributor, which would lend support to both individual and collective strategies as winning the majority would serve advancement well. As an established leader, he would know which races to target to keep that majority. Roy Blunt exemplifies collective pursuits, as he stepped down from his leadership post in early 2006. Regardless, he exhibits the highest betweenness centrality within the House. In this case, while he does take in contributions, he primarily distributed funds to other leadership PACs. Another significant node, Oxley, also lends itself to collective goals, as Oxley did not run for re-election in 2006. All of Oxley's ties are as a giver, thus playing an expansionist role, attempting to keep the Republicans in power on the House side.

The 2008 Republican Leadership PAC network shows fragmentation (Figure 5), with several distinct components, consisting primarily of dyads or triads. The two largest components generally reflect the two chambers, House and Senate. McConnell and Lott play a role in linking various actors on the Senate component (right side, figure 5). On the House side, the primary players appear to be Tom Feeney and Eric Cantor. Feeney was defeated in his re-election bid; the Democratic Party campaigned heavily to defeat him. Closer inspection of the digraph reveals that he is prominent: his leadership PAC was primarily a recipient from his colleagues, who presumably were




Figure 6. DLP PAC giving 1992

trying to save his election. On the other hand, Cantor is expansive, giving to other candidates, either for individual goals (advancement) or to regain majority status. In this case, he is an example of someone who would benefit from pursuing both individual goals (advancement within the leadership structure) and collective goals (achieving majority status). If the Republicans had regained control of the House of Representatives, his leadership position, he gained immediately following the election would be much more consequential.

5. Cash flows to other organizations

Leadership PACs also donate to the national, state and local parties, the campaign arms of the two parties within Congress as well as other PACs (ideological and business). A very successful fundraiser can redistribute his or her success to a colleague, the parties or other organizations. Giving to other party committees can be an indicator of both individual and collective goals. Presumably, giving to your own state party committee enhances your re-election effort; giving more generously across multiple states and organizations may indicate national aspirations; and giving to the national parties may be indicative of both




Figure 8. DLP PAC giving 2000




Figure 7. RLP PAC giving 1992

types of goals.

This section examines the full population of leadership committees giving to other political committees in 1992, 2000 and 2008. Many member PACs do not contribute to one another but do form financial ties with political parties and other organizations. The networks from the previous section are embedded in these networks. Leadership PACs are indicated with triangles, party organizations with diamonds, and all other PACs with circles. Again, I use spring-embedding to visualize the six networks. Node size is set to betweenness centrality in order to better evaluate a member PAC's role in the network with respect to the flow of money. I first discuss and compare the structure of the networks as a whole before turning to a discussion of individual roles within that structure.

5.1. Leadership PAC giving over time

Several interesting trends are apparent. More leadership PACs form relationships over time with other PACs. The Democratic leadership PAC network consists of 43 actors/ 48 ties in 1992 and 223 actors/501 ties in 2008. The Republican member PAC network is similar, ranging from 52 actors/43 ties to




Figure 9. RLP PAC giving 2000




Figure 10. DLP PAC giving 2008

402 nodes/644 ties for the same years. Democratic member PACs link to political organizations earlier than Republicans, creating a balanced network over time. The Republicans approximate a core-periphery structure.

In 1992, the central players for both Republicans and Democrats are established leaders within Congress, who primarily distribute funds to other PACs (Figures 6 and 7). The Democratic leadership link to their political party organizations through donations to them, acting expansively. Thus, leaders within the Democratic Party are sharing their largesse with organizations that can better target races. This is reflective of a maintaining or an expansion strategy, or strategies to keep or attain majority. The Republican leadership network also appears to be acting expansively, consistent with collective goals. However, the 1992 Republican network is sparse, consisting of several small components; two of these are of star configurations consisting solely of donations to other committees.

The pattern of coordinating with the party organizations becomes much more evident in 2000 and 2008 for both parties (Figures 8-11). In addition, the graphs for both parties clearly show more actors, reflecting the increased use of leadership PACs more generally (Figure 1). Finally, the Democratic leadership networks appear to exhibit more connectivity or coordination in both 2000 and 2008 (Figures 8 and 10) than their Republican counterparts (Figures 9 and 11). The Republican leadership networks give the impression of multiple core-periphery structures, particularly in 2008, which may be consistent with hierarchical leadership. It may also indicate that this network is more fragile, especially if one of the more central players retires. The Republicans appear to have a small number of key actors who control the flow of money, which would be consistent with collective goals of majority-building and party discipline within the institution. The




Figure 11. RLP PAC giving 2008

Democratic network has more channels for the money to flow perhaps allowing for ambition.

Some basic network statistics for the overall networks are presented in Table 1. All six networks are sparse, as measured by network density. Network density is simply the proportion of all possible ties that are actually present. While there are far more actors present in these networks and over time, legislators are very selective in whom they choose for a contribution. While the Democratic member PACs consistently make more ties within their network, the largest percentage of ties they make is in 1992, at 2.6% of possible links. This does suggest that leadership PACs use donations strategically, as they do not appear to make indiscriminant connections.

Table 1. Network density and centralization

	1992		2000		2008	
	R	D	R	D	R	D
Out-degree	.443	.241	.203	.192	.194	.153
In-degree	.024	.143	.139	.117	.186	.189
Density	.016	.026	.007	.013	.004	.010
Nodes	52	43	188	109	402	223
Ties	43	48	230	164	644	501

Measures of network centralization provide insight into the overall structure of each network and allows for comparison across networks. A highly centralized network is dominated by a few actors, which could easily fragment into unconnected subgroups; less centralized networks are much more resilient. Here, I use Freeman's approach to calculate both in-degree and out-degree centralization for directed ties. In addition, I dichotomized the values to ease interpretation; scores can be expressed as percentages. Centralization scores indicate the degree of asymmetry in contributions. High in-degree centralization would indicate that a small number of actors receive contributions (either to save their election or to re-

distribute). A high out-degree score would indicate that a small number of actors distribute funds or control the flow of money.

First, out-degree centralization, which is higher for the Republican leadership networks, decreases for both parties. It is an indicator of the increased use of member PACs by more actors in attempting to affect outcomes. It could also be an indicator of individual goals by building a loyal base among members, circumventing the parties. The change over time is most dramatic for the Republicans, moving from 44% in 1992 to half that amount in 2008. The Democratic networks also decline from 24% to 15%. In both cases, the out-degree scores indicate much more stable networks, less likely to completely fragment, but also that a fair amount of autonomy occurs within the networks by 2008 in terms of giving cash, consistent with individual goals.

All the networks have lower in-degree centralization scores, with the exception of the Democrats in 2008, whose in-degree score is 3.6% higher than the out-degree score for 2008, and 7.24% greater than the in-degree score in 2000. This could reflect increased fundraising prowess over time from the Democratic leadership network once the Democrats regained control of both the House and Senate in 2007. The Republican leadership network increases from 2.35% in 13.86% in 2000 and 18.6% in 2008. In all cases, for both parties, a greater number of PACs are recipients over time.

5. 2. Centrality and reach

Measures of centrality are useful for assessing important actors are relative to one another. Degree centrality scores in directed networks provide information about how prominent, prestigious or expansive that actor is. Betweenness centrality scores are used to assess an actor's location in the network and control over the flow of resources [15][24]. High in-degree centrality signifies that the individual is prestigious, or a recipient of donations. This could be because that actor is in trouble electorally, or in a position to redistribute funds to other individuals in need. High out-degree centrality indicates expansiveness, or individuals who are generous with their cash flow. Finally, high betweenness suggests that that actor is important to connecting various parts of the network and insuring that resources flow.

Table 2 presents information on who gives and receives for 2000 and 2008. Two types of centrality are presented: degree and betweenness (normalized, using Freeman's approach). For both parties, the most prominent recipients are the campaign arms of each chamber. These campaign organizations, headed up by rising stars in each chamber, indicate fundraising prowess in terms of acquiring cash. This is consistent with attracting funds to target important races, hence to support collective goals. Members give to these organizations as they can make the best strategic use of the contribution.

Not surprisingly, the actors with the highest

Table 2. Normalized Freeman degree and betweenness centrality for selected observations

Republicans	2000		2008	
Indegree	National Rep. Congressional Cmte.	14.44	National Rep. Congressional Cmte.	18.95
	National Rep. Senatorial Cmte.	6.42	National Rep. Senatorial Cmte.	10.72
Outdegree	Americans for Rep. Majority (DeLay)	20.88	Freedom Fund (Crapo)	19.70
	New Republican Majority Fund (Lott)	1.26	Freedom Project (Boehner)	17.21
Betweenness	Americans for Rep. Majority (DeLay)	0.111	Freedom Project (Boehner)	0.201
	Bayou Leader PAC (Tauzin)	0.076	Growth & Prosperity (Bachus)	0.050
Democrats	2000		2008	
Indegree	Dem. Congressional Campaign Cmte.	12.96	Dem. Senatorial Campaign Cmte.	19.82
	Dem. Senatorial Campaign Cmte.	12.04	Dem. Cong. Campaign Cmte.	18.02
	Democratic National Committee	10.19		
Outdegree	District 20 FL (Deutsch)	20.37	AmeriPAC (Hoyer)	16.22
	PAC for a Change (Boxer)	16.67	HILLPAC (Clinton)	11.71
	DASHPAC (Daschle)	10.19	Searchlight Leadership Fund (Reid)	9.46
	Leadership of Today & Tomorrow (Becerra)	10.19	National Leadership (Rangel)	9.01
Betweenness	PAC for a Change (Boxer)	0.151	HILLPAC (Clinton)	0.452
	America Works (S. Brown)	0.043	BRIDGE PAC (Clyburn)	0.112
			Unite Our States (Biden)	0.09

centrality (out-degree or betweenness) are generally those already in a position of power with Congress and not vulnerable electorally. They can afford generosity – expansiveness. They can also target races to achieve the collective goals of party discipline (reward loyalists) and party building. Crapo at first appears odd, until one recognizes that he never faces a real challenge to re-election in Idaho. As a safe incumbent, he is free to pursue collective goals along with the party leaders and former leaders (Lott) though individual ambition cannot be ruled out.

Regarding ambition, some interest points are relevant for the Democrats. The most expansive legislator in 2000 is Peter Deutsch (FL), who often ran unopposed for re-election. He did have ambition for higher office, running for the Democratic nomination for Senate unsuccessfully in 2004. Interestingly, Clinton’s committee has both high out-degree centrality in the 2008 cycle and betweenness centrality, reflecting both her fundraising prowess and her presidential ambitions. Whereas she was a recipient in the member-PAC only network, here she also has donor propensity, particularly to state party organizations.

To further understanding of leadership PAC giving, I studied the ego networks, or neighborhoods, of several key member PACs. I focused on the out-neighborhoods – or all the ties from an ego, or focal member PAC, to others political organizations, their alters. The focus of the analysis is on the 2008 data presented in Table 3 and the concept of reach.

The concept of reach speaks to the ability of the ego to connect to the entire network. This is yet another way to think about the influence of key players. Specifically, two-step reach, or the percentage of all actors in the entire network the ego can reach in “two-steps”, for our top leadership PACs shows some variance among the egos. Despite the fact that several of our leader PACs involve party leaders and

presidential aspirants, only two house Democrats (Hoyer and Rangel) and one house Republican (Boehner) can reach a majority of the actors in their networks. This is can be thought of as the ability of the contribution to have a trickle down affect, as someone like Hoyer can reach 60% of the network through a “friend of a friend”, while others, such as McConnell can only reach 17% of the Republican network in this manner. In 2008, then, some Democratic leaders were better able to serve the entire network than the Republicans.

6. Conclusions

The rational choice perspective of individual goal directed behavior fits American political behavior well. Over time, legislators created institutions to overcome the inherent collective action problems prevalent in our legislative and electoral systems. But even these institutions, such as political parties, must overcome the candidate-centered nature of federal elections. The campaign finance system provides an additional institutional mechanism – leadership PACs – that can help achieve both individual and collective goals. Members can be expansive or generous and simultaneously achieve goals of re-election, advancement and party building.

From this study, several things are clear. First, when studying the within-member PAC networks, the Republicans were faster to organize and share cash with one another. Within-PAC giving could highlight individual goals, particularly those of advancement and alliance building. Second, when examining the larger context of leadership PAC to PAC giving, the Democrats make more use of their extant party structure, coordinating with them earlier and more often than the Republicans. This would have the effect of strengthening the party structure over time.

Some confirmatory evidence for contribution strategies exists. Individuals with safe seats, not running or who have retired appear to be expansionist, consistent with collective, party-building goals. Members in party leadership positions within Congress, having already achieved advancement, follow strategies to maintain or expand the coalition. While it is impossible to distinguish individual and collective strategies for other members in this data, it is possible that they are pursuing both simultaneously. Last, while advancement strategies would suggest that individuals would give more to colleagues [10], this is not the case when it comes to Clinton. Most of her donations went to garner support in among the rank and file, laying the grounds for a primary run,

Table 3. Selected "neighborhoods", 2008

	Size	Density	2 Reach
Crapo (R, Senate)	79	0.00	32.42
Boehner (R, House)	69	0.04	49.63
Hoyer (D, House)	36	0.00	60.81
Clinton (D, Senate)	26	0.00	47.3
Rangel (D, House)	20	3.16	51.8
McConnell (R, Senate)	15	4.29	16.71
Bachus (R, House)	15	3.33	41.15
Nadler (D, House)	15	3.33	34.23
Lott (R, Senate)	12	3.79	34.16

suggesting a different strategy when it comes to winning a different institution

This exploratory analysis does not test the hypotheses posed about behavior, as it only examines cash flows from leadership PACs to one another and to other PACs, not candidates. However, studying the network of financial ties is a first step in evaluating the structure Congressional relationships. If structure in the social network perspective is viewed as enduring patterns of relations, then simple cross-sectional analyses of dynamic processes miss the evolution or changes within the context of decision-making. Network analysis is useful here in elucidating the endogenous nature of campaign finance. Another benefit of network analysis over most statistical methods is that actors are explicitly modeled as interdependent. Future research must disentangle whether politicians create the network, or if the network determines their behavior. Any quantitative analysis must take into account the embedded nature of the observations when conducting hypothesis testing and causal analysis [4][14].

7. References

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