

1-1-2010

Explaining decision-making structures in Swiss politics: A combination of SNA and QCA

Manuel Fischer

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and University of Geneva, Switzerland, manuel.fischer@unige.ch

Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2010

Recommended Citation

Fischer, Manuel, "Explaining decision-making structures in Swiss politics: A combination of SNA and QCA" (2010). 2010. Paper 2.
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2010/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Conference Proceedings at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact jnabe@lib.siu.edu.

Explaining decision-making structures in Swiss politics:

A combination of SNA and QCA¹

Manuel Fischer

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (USA) / University of Geneva (CH)

Manuel.Fischer@unige.ch

Abstract

This paper attempts to explain decision-making structures in Swiss politics. Decision-making structures describe the relations between collective actors collaborating and fighting for influence in a policy network and are defined by two main dimensions, which are power and conflict. For the explanation of decision-making structures, the paper relies on factors such as Europeanization, media presence, federalism, the pre-parliamentary phase and the referendum. I assume that these different factors interact with each other when they influence the decision-making structure. In order to assess the importance of these factors, the paper compares the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006. The analysis relies on an innovative integration of two methods. In a first step, I apply Social Network Analysis to describe the two dimensions of decision-making structures. In a second step, in order to detect the different combinations of causes which lead to different structures, the 11 cases are compared by a Qualitative-Comparative Analysis (QCA). The results suggest that all five factors are important to understand decision-making structures and that equifinality and conjunctural causation are at work.

¹ Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the ASNA (Applications of Social Network Analysis) Conference, University of Zurich, September 2009, at the “séminaire du staff”, Department of political science, University of Geneva, March 2010, and at the ECPR Joint Sessions, University of Münster, March 2010.

1 Introduction

This paper attempts to explain political decision-making structures. A decision-making structure represents the specific patterns of relations between collective actors which are collaborating, fighting and struggling for influence in a policy network. It is defined by mainly two dimensions, which are power and conflict (see Laumann and Pappi 1976, Kriesi 1980, Waarden 1992, Sciarini 1994, Knoke *et al.* 1996, Kriesi *et al.* 2006a). Decision-making structures are important because of their influence on the output of the decision-making processes (e.g. Knoke 1990, Sciarini 1994, 1996, Daugbjerg and Marsh 1998, Marsh and Smith 2000, Fischer *et al.* 2003). However, there is an important question that logically precedes the question on the relationship between the decision-making structure and the output. One has to detect why a given decision-making structure forms (Jönsson *et al.* 1998: 332, König and Bräuninger 1998: 446, Linder 2005: 117). Thus, this paper raises the following question: *How can one explain political decision-making structures?*

To answer this question, the present paper compares the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006. By doing so, it attempts to establish the factors that are responsible for a specific decision-making structure to form. The factors that are expected to influence the decision-making structure are Europeanization, media presence, the pre-parliamentary phase, federalism and the referendum. There exist several studies analyzing the influence of one of these factors on decision-making structures (or a dimension of it). However, given the increasing complexity of political systems (Hall 2003, Schmitter 2009), it is very implausible that one factor alone can fully explain decision-making structures. For instance, the literature on Europeanization (siehe Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 255f., Börzel and Risse 2003: 60, Radaelli 2003: 27, Schmidt 2006: 671, Haverland 2007) or on federalism (Braun 2000: 5, 11) ask no longer *whether*, but *how*, and under which circumstances these factors influence decision-making structures. Therefore, this study considers the joint impact of different factors and their possible interactions. Moreover, while the literature traditionally tended to attribute a specific decision-making structure to a whole country, it is now acknowledged that differences between policy domains are more relevant and that no single pattern of decision-making structure exists within one country. Therefore, the present analysis concentrates on the level of policy domains within one country (Laumann and Knoke 1987, Atkinson and Coleman 1989, Waarden 1992, Knoke *et al.* 1996, Kriesi *et al.* 2006a). Besides simply highlighting the important differences between policy domains, this sectoral approach also makes use of this variance in order to identify the factors that affect

decision-making structures. A first objective of the paper is thus to detect the causal paths that lead to different decision-making structures.

The second aim is methodological, as the paper is supposed to demonstrate the utility of applying a sequential mixed methods design. Concretely, the study combines Social Network Analysis (SNA, Wasserman and Faust 1994, Carrington *et al.* 2005) and Qualitative-Comparative Analysis (QCA, Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008). Social Network Analysis – as a tool to precisely describe cases – and QCA – as a tool to systematically compare them – combine very well for the analysis of complex phenomena such as decision-making structures (Spreitzer and Yamasaki 2008). On the one hand, my analysis will show that tools of SNA are very valuable for the process of calibration of the different dimensions of decision-making structures. On the other hand, it provides a demonstration of the fruitful combination of SNA and QCA. Note however that QCA emphasizes the dialogue between theoretical ideas and empirical evidence (Ragin 1987, 2000) and that this paper is but a first step of this dialogue. Therefore, the results of the comparative analysis in the second part of the paper are to be taken with caution as they do not constitute “final”, robust findings, but more intermediate results to be worked on.

The paper is structured as follows. Chapter two discusses the link of policy networks and decision-making structures and introduces the two main constitutive dimensions of decision-making structures. The different factors that are expected to influence the decision-making structure are presented in chapter three. Chapter four presents the methods, the data and the calibration of the outcome and the conditions. Results are presented in chapter five, chapter six concludes.

2 Policy networks and decision-making structures

By their multiple relations, collective actors that are part of a political system – such as state actors, political parties, interest groups or regional actors – form a policy network. Such policy networks can be observed at the level of the whole political system (e.g. Kriesi 1994, Kriesi 2007) or at the level of single policy domains (e.g. Katzenstein 1978, Atkinson and Coleman 1989, Schneider 1992, Sciarini 1994, Knoke *et al.* 1996). In the context of this paper, a policy network is defined as a general and neutral term expressing the fact that different actors are connected by different kinds of relations (Waarden 1992, Kriesi 1994, Sciarini 1995, 1996, Kriesi *et al.* 2006a, Kriesi 2007).² The structure that the policy network

² Note however that there exists certain confusion in the literature on the definition of a policy network. First, the concept is used as a metaphor for any type of relations between actors in a policy domain, but it is not backed by

assumes is specified by the decision-making structure. This specific structure has an influence on the output of the process (siehe z.B. Atkinson and Coleman 1989: 50ff., Kriesi 1994: 21, Kriesi and Jegen 2001: 251, Marsh and Smith 2001: 536, Christopoulos 2008: 476).³ Note however that decision-making structures are quite general descriptions and that phenomena on a more micro-level, such as strategic interactions between single actors, are not caught on this level of abstraction. A decision-making structure should therefore be conceived of as a general map of the decision-making process, which delivers an overview of the structural positions of the different actors (Dowding 1995: 157).⁴

Decision-making structures contain two constitutive dimensions, which are power and conflict. These are two of the most basic and important concepts of political science. As Heclo (1974: 304) states:

„Tradition teaches that politics is about conflict and power.“

These two dimensions are strongly linked and condition each other. On the one hand, knowing which actors are powerful without being aware of their positions is of little use. On the other hand, identifying the different positions is not very interesting without looking at which actor is able to enforce its positions. Given this close connection, power and conflict are often jointly analyzed in the literature (e.g. Laumann and Pappi 1976, Sabatier 1987, Knoke *et al.* 1996, Fischer *et al.* 2003, Sciarini *et al.* 2004, Kriesi *et al.* 2006a). In what follows, I describe the two dimensions of decision-making structures.

2.1 Power

Max Weber defines power as

„...any chance to achieve its own will in a social relationship even against resistance.“
(Weber 1980, cited in Weiss 1996: 306).

any empirical observations. This lack of empirical basis makes it difficult to use a policy network as a part of a causal model to be tested empirically (Dowding 1995, 2001, Christopoulos 2008). Second, the concept is also used not as a neutral term, but as a new and qualitatively different form of policy making, situated between the state and the market. This again is problematic because the promising concept can then only be applied to a very restricted number of situations.

³ Marsh und Smith (2000: 9) rightly emphasize that this relation between decision-making structures and the output of the decision-making process is not unidirectional, but that the output also influences the decision-making structures due to a feedback-mechanisms. However, this „dialectical model“ is too complicated and therefore of little use for analytic and empirical applications (Dowding 2001: 102).

⁴ Note that this conception also implies that temporal development of a decision-making process is neglected. The different phases of the process are analyzed together, therefore decision-making structures as reconstructed in this paper represent a simplified, synthetic and map of the decision-making process.

The question of who possesses power is one of the most basic questions in political science (see e.g. Dahl 1961). The objective is to find out which actor is able to impose its policy objectives and thereby to influence political decision-making (e.g. Laumann and Pappi 1976, Waarden 1992, Kriesi 1994, Knoke *et al.* 1996, Sciarini *et al.* 2004). This can be conceived of as a hierarchy, with the most powerful actor at the top and the other actors occupying the ranges according to their relative power. Two elements define the form of such a power hierarchy. On the one hand, one has to define which actor or type of actor is most powerful. On the other hand, power can be concentrated in the hands of just a few actors or it can be shared among several actors.

Concerning the first aspect, the dominant actor, the most important distinction is whether state actors or non-state actors dominate the decision-making process. This distinction is guided by the logic of the function of the actors in the political system. While representatives of the central state are official decision-makers presumed to defend the general interest, non-state actors try to get as much access as possible to the decision-making process and to influence the output according to their interests. The comparison of the central state's power compared to its societal and political environment serves to evaluate to which degree the state is autonomous in its decisions (see e.g. Katzenstein 1978, Skocpol 1985, Atkinson and Coleman 1989, Schmidt 2006). The category of state actors contains representatives of the federal government and the federal administration. Non-state actors include political parties, interest groups, and the cantons.

The second aspect emphasizes the form of the power hierarchy between the actors. The question is to which degree power is distributed among the actors. The most influent actor can be very dominating in the sense that he is the only one that really influences the decision-making process, while the rest of the actors play only minor roles. Alternatively, power can be largely distributed among several actors and no one clearly dominates the structure. In this case, no single actor can impose its preferences, but a high number of actors can potentially influence the decision (see e.g. Katzenstein 1978, Atkinson and Coleman 1989, Kriesi *et al.* 2006a).

2.2 Conflict

Like power, conflict is one of the most basic and classic concepts of political science.⁵ In a modern political system, where a lot of different actors with different interests interact, conflict is unavoidable (Laumann and Pappi 1976: 26). It is

„...an endemic, necessary feature of any decision-making apparatus, which poses the fundamental functional problem of establishing binding priorities among competing goals.“ (Laumann and Pappi 1976: 26).

Conflict is thus an important dimension of decision-making structures between political actors (e.g. Laumann and Pappi 1976, Knoke 1990, Schneider 1992, Knoke 1993, Kriesi *et al.* 2006a).⁶ It has two important characteristics. On the one hand, it is important to assess the substance of the conflict, thus the nature of the conflict line. On the other hand, conflict can be strong or weak.

The conflict line is defined by assessing which actors oppose each other. The substance of the conflict is inferred from the information on the opposing actors. Nowadays, two conflict lines are relevant in politics (Kriesi 1998, Kriesi *et al.* 2006b, 2008).⁷ First, an old and important conflict line exists between the market and the state, where the traditional right opposes the traditional left. While the right and bourgeois parties as well as employers' associations and interest groups of the economy defend free markets, left parties and unions defend more state intervention. Second, there exists a newer, but lately very important conflict between defenders of openness of a country and defenders of its traditions. In this case, the nationalistic SVP and representatives of the domestic economy oppose the center-right parties, the representatives of the export economy as well as the political left.

The second aspect, the intensity of the conflict, gives an idea on how much the opposing positions differ from each other. There is reason to believe that conflict is more intense if fundamentally different values and ideologies oppose each other. If the disagreement is only

⁵ Already in the early 20th century, Carl Schmitt defines politics as the differentiation between friends and enemies (see e.g. Rieger 1995).

⁶ Note that studies about conflict in Swiss politics are quite rare, which might be due to the fact that Switzerland is often seen as being the consensus democracy *par excellence*, where institutions and the political culture foster consensus building (Neidhart 1970, Kriesi 1980, Lijphart 1999). For instance, it is not yet clear how exactly the degree of Europeanization or the intensity of the pre-parliamentary phase influence the level of conflict (Neidhart 1970, Sciarini *et al.* 2002, Nicolet *et al.* 2003, Sciarini 2006).

⁷ Originally, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identify 4 main conflict lines (cleavages) between capital and work, land and urban interests, state and church, and center and periphery. It is argued that the classic cleavages lose salience or adapt because of economic and cultural developments.

about technical details, conflict is supposed to be less intense (see the three levels of opinions in Sabatier 1987, 2006).

3 Factors affecting the conflict structure

In order to find an explanation for the different decision-making structures, I take into account five factors. As mentioned in the introduction, I expect these factors to jointly influence the decision-making structure. However, given the more explorative nature of this analysis and the high number of possible interactions, I will not formulate hypotheses about the joint impact of these factors on the decision-making structures. In order to nevertheless guide the lecturer, expectations about their independent influence are formulated at the end of the presentation of each factor. I take into account factors already included in earlier studies (Sciarini *et al.* 2002, Nicolet *et al.* 2003, Sciarini 2006), namely the intensity of the pre-parliamentary phase and the degree of Europeanization. Additionally, I introduce three other factors, which are media presence, federalism and the referendum.⁸

3.1 Europeanization

The influence of the European Union even on non-memberstates like Switzerland is well assessed in the literature (Mach *et al.* 2003, Sciarini *et al.* 2004, Fischer 2005). Europeanization describes the phenomenon that more and more formerly domestic decision-making processes are influenced by the European environment. Not only is the substance of public policies affected, but also the institutions of the decision-making process and the relations among political actors is influenced (Sciarini *et al.* 2004). First, because of the existence of international negotiations, state actors are expected to dominate Europeanized processes. Second, such processes tend to be closed, which makes that power is rather concentrated in the hand of very few actors. Third, Europeanization has an influence on the conflict line. It has been shown that in Europeanized cases the classical left-right division loses its importance and the main conflict takes place between defenders of the opening of the country towards the outside and defenders of traditions and international independence (Brunner and Sciarini 2002, Kriesi *et al.* 2006b, 2008). Fourth and finally, the degree of Europeanization of a policy domain is expected to have an influence on the conflict level. In

⁸ I am aware of the fact that some of these factors – mainly the existence of a referendum and media presence – can also be seen as being a consequence more than a cause of a given decision-making structure. However, remember that the decision-making structure describes an overall, synthetic picture of the process from its beginning until the end. In this sense, all of the factors can be conceived of as causes for a given decision-making structure.

this respect, two opposing theoretical arguments exist. On the one hand, problems concerning the opening and international exposition of the country may push internal actors to close their ranks (see Katzenstein 1984, 1985). In this case, conflict is expected to be lower. On the other hand however, the fact that Europeanized acts have a strong “take-it-or-leave-it” character reduces the room for maneuver of internal actors such as political parties and interest groups (Moravcsik 1994).

3.2 Media presence

With the mediatization of politics, politics adapted a media logic and political actors have become more dependent on media and communication (Blumler and Kavanagh 1996, Wolfsfeld 1997, Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999). Besides the work and lobbying in the institutional arenas, the mobilization of the public opinion has become an important influence strategy for political actors. In this new context, political actors compete for media attention in order to attract public support for their policy plans, and thereby pressure policy-makers and influence political outputs (Danielian and Page 1994, Wolfsfeld 1997, Tresch 2008). Also political actors in Switzerland “struggle for media attention“ (Wolfsfeld 1997), as statements in the television or the Sunday press are said to have more important consequences than direct lobbying in the parliament (Häusermann *et al.* 2004, Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Especially actors with little influence in the decision-making process can try to mobilize public attention and thereby expand the conflict (Schattschneider 1960). Strong media presence has the following consequences on the decision-making structure. First, mainly external actors are supposed to attempt to mobilize the public opinion by being present in the media. Therefore, external actors are expected to dominate the process. Second, due to the same reason, power tends to be largely distributed. Third, following the argument of conflict expansion, I expect highly mediatized acts to display higher conflict levels. The conflict line is not affected by this factor.

3.3 The referendum

In Switzerland, after an act has passed the usual legislative process, it can still be defeated in a popular referendum.⁹ If it takes place, this last phase of the decision-making process is crucial as it can invalid a policy project as a whole. That is why the threat of launching an optional

⁹ There exist two kinds of referendums. One is mandatory and takes place in the case of an amendment of the constitution or of certain international treaties. The other kind of referendum is optional. 50'000 citizens or 8 cantons can request a popular vote on every federal law or decree after it was voted in parliament.

referendum is a strategic influence option for political actors whose interests were not taken into account during the decision-making process. But even when the referendum is mandatory, decision-makers must open up the decision-making process in order to include a broad range of societal interests and thereby avoid a defeat in the popular vote. In any case, political actors have to fight hard for their positions in a referendum campaign, as they lose control over the destiny of the project (Sciarini and Trechsel 1996, Linder 2005: 251). Therefore, whenever a referendum takes place, it influences the decision-making structure. First, the opening up of the process has the consequence that external actors dominate over state actors. Second, the same mechanisms leads to a large distribution of power. Third, the conflict level is high in the case of a referendum vote. The referendum has no influence on the conflict line.

3.4 The pre-parliamentary phase

The pre-parliamentary phase is commonly seen as the key phase in decision-making processes in Swiss politics, mainly for two reasons (e.g. Kriesi 1980).¹⁰ First, the pre-parliamentary phase has an important status in Swiss politics, as the possibility of a referendum makes that a broad range of actors must be included in order to elaborate a consensual solution from the very beginning on (Neidhart 1970). The pre-parliamentary phase offers a certain number of access points which allow non-state actors to express their view and to influence the project accordingly.¹¹ Second, and partly because of the first reason, the pre-parliamentary phase is considered important because the most important decisions concerning the substance and form of the act are usually taken at this early stage of the decision-making process. The openness of the pre-parliamentary phase, that is the opportunity for external actors to access the decision-making arenas, is supposed to influence the decision-making structure. Concerning the power dimension, an open pre-parliamentary phase leads to first, a large distribution of power and second, a dominance of external over state actors. Further, an open pre-parliamentary phase should lower the conflict level among the actors involved in the decision-making process.¹² The first aspect of the conflict dimension, the dominant conflict line, is not affected by this factor.

¹⁰ As stated by Sciarini (2006: 498), the importance of this phase heavily contrasts with the lack of scientific knowledge about it. The studies of Kriesi (1980), Germann *et al.* (1985) or Poitry (1989) are outdated, the only recent empiric work on the pre-parliamentary is by Sciarini *et al.* (2002).

¹¹ According to Neidhart's (1970) reasoning, the intense pre-parliamentary phase with several access points for non-state actors is designed to avoid a referendum.

¹² However, note that Sciarini *et al.* (2002) find no clear results concerning the influence of the intensity of the pre-parliamentary phase on the level of conflict in the following stages of the process.

3.5 Federalism

In federalist states decision-making and implementation competences are shared between the central and the regional level. Compared to other federal states, Swiss cantons even enjoy particularly large competences (Braun 2003, Vatter 2006). Lately, one observes a certain centralization of decision-making competences in Switzerland, but due to its relatively poor resources the federal administration stays dependent on the cantons for implementation. Therefore, different competences overlap between the federal and the cantonal level and cantons are still powerful players in Swiss politics (Germann 2002, Braun 2003, Sciarini 2005, Sciarini and Bochler 2006). However, the competence distribution varies between different policy domains and so does the influence of the cantons. In domains where cantons have important interests because their competences are directly concerned, societal interests tend to be eclipsed. But even if societal actors are less important, the importance of the cantons implies that external actors are dominant over state actors. It is argued that in federalist decision-making processes, the central state does not have to negotiate with two conflicting sides, but can concentrate on finding a constructive solution with only the cantons (see e.g. Thomas 2001: 16f., Linder 2005: 117). Power is therefore expected to be concentrated in the hands of a small number of actors. Additionally, the argument above supports that conflict is low. Federalism does not influence the nature of the conflict line.

4 Methods and data

4.1 Social Network Analysis, Qualitative Comparative Analysis and their combination

The present analysis integrates Social Network Analysis (SNA, Wasserman and Faust 1994, Carrington *et al.* 2005) and Qualitative-Comparative Analysis (QCA, Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008) in a so-called sequential design (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 18, Morse 2003). The two methods have, with very few exceptions (Stevenson and Greenberg 2000, Spreitzer and Yamasaki 2008, Magetti 2009), never been combined before. However, as this application will show, they are highly compatible. In a first step, tools of SNA are used to characterize the different decision-making structures. SNA serves well for this purpose, being an approach that focuses on the analysis of links (power and conflict relations) between nodes (collective actors). Thus, it is able to describe the specific decision-making structure in the different networks. While the description of decision-making structures is without a doubt of great value for the understanding of specific decision-making processes, it cannot by itself explain

the formation of decision-making structures.¹³ This is why in a second step, a causal element is added to the research design by comparing the 11 cases in a Qualitative-Comparative Analysis (QCA, Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008). This allows detecting the multiple configurations of causes leading to a specific decision-making structure. QCA serves especially well to analyze phenomena which are supposed to be the result of multiple conjunctural causation, where different combinations of conditions can lead to the same outcome. For the present analysis, I rely on fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), in which the different conditions and the outcome to be explained can take continuous values to account for different degrees of presence of a phenomenon.¹⁴ QCA being mainly a case-based method, the definition of these values, called calibration, is based on the thick description of the cases. Such a calibration procedure should always be based on multiple indicators in order to have a complete view on the case and to check for consistency of the results (Goertz 2006, Schneider and Wagemann 2007). In the present analysis, the description is made with SNA-based indicators as well as with other empirical information out of documentary sources. As indicated above, decision-making structures are composed of the two main dimensions conflict and power, each containing two aspects. There are thus four outcomes to explain, which requires four separate fsQCA.

4.2 Data

This paper compares the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006.¹⁵ The cases are the 11th pension reform, the program of budget relief 2003, the extension of the bilateral agreement on the free movement of persons and flanking measures, the bilateral agreement on the taxation of savings, the bilateral agreement on Schengen/Dublin, the law on nuclear energy, the law on the infrastructure fund, the new law on foreigners, the reform of fiscal equalization and tasks distribution, the new constitutional articles on education and the law on telecommunication.

Data on these cases was gathered through approximately 250 semi-structured interviews with representatives of organizations involved in the 11 decision-making processes under study. Based on positional, decisional, and reputational approaches (see e.g. Knoke 1993: 30), 20 to 30 organizational actors per process were identified and interviewed. Most of the interviews

¹³ In fact, SNA is has often be criticized to be merely descriptive (see e.g. Dowding 1995).

¹⁴ Note that the original, crisp-set QCA mechanism requires the dichotomization of the conditions and the outcome, which of course leads to quite crude measures. See Rihoux and Ragin (2008: 119) for a more extended discussion of the advantages of fsQCA over other forms of QCA.

¹⁵ This according to an exhaustive expert survey for all processes that passed a parliamentary vote between December 2001 and December 2006. Data were gathered for the research project “The Swiss decision-making system in the 21th century: power, institutions, conflicts (Sciarini and Serdült 2006).

were conducted between February and July 2008. In line with the dominant conception (Laumann and Knoke 1987, Knoke *et al.* 1996: 7), the study focuses on organizations and the individual interview partners were asked to respond in the name of their organization. Additionally, the study of official documents¹⁶ on the cases provide me with supplementary information.

4.3 Fuzzy-set calibration

In what follows, I present the different indicators that were used for the calibration of the conditions and the outcomes of each case. Ideally, the calibration procedure relies on previous thick case descriptions. Due to the lack of space for such an endeavor, the raw data, that is the values of the different indicators for each case are presented in appendix 1. These indicators help to assess to which degree a case is a member of a given set. If a case is fully in a set, it has a fuzzy score of 1, if a case is fully out of it, a score of 0 is attributed. Intermediate scores like 0.8 (0.2) mean that a case is not fully, but mainly in (out of) the set, scores like 0.6 (0.4) mean that a case is more or less in (out of) the set. Table 1 below summarizes the codes accorded to the different cases.

4.3.1 Calibration of the outcomes

The first aspect of the power dimension, the dominant actor (DA), is covered by the membership of a case in the set of decision-making structures totally dominated by state actors. The negation of this set is a set of decision-making structures totally dominated by external, non-state actors. Indicators are based on the reputation scores for the different actors. These were gathered by asking interview partners to mention, from a list comprising all actors participating in the process, the actors they considered to be first, very influent, and second, among the three most influent actors in the given decision-making structure. From this, I calculated on the one hand the share of actors belonging to a specific actor type (state actors, political parties, interest groups, cantons) compared to the total number of actors with a minimum reputation score of 50% (corresponding to the actors in the "core", see Kriesi 1980) respectively 75%.¹⁷ On the other hand, I defined the dominant actor type according to the average and the part-of-the-sum¹⁸ of the actor types' reputation score. These indicators were

¹⁶ Mainly the governments dispatch to the parliament ("Botschaft / message").

¹⁷ Only based on the results from the "very influent actors"- question.

¹⁸ The part-of-the-sum measure was calculated in the following way: First, I summed up the reputation values of all single actors to a total reputation value of the process. On this basis I calculated the share of this "overall influence" for each group of actors.

calculated twice, once for the “very influent actors”- question and once for the “three most influent actors”-question.

The second aspect, the distribution of power (PD), is defined by the membership scores of a case in the set of decision-making structures where power is largely distributed. The negation of this set is a set of decision-making structures with a concentration of power in the hands of one actor. Indicators for the attribution of membership scores are on the one hand the absolute number of actors in the core (gt 50%), the absolute number of actors with more that 75% of reputation and the absolute number of actors mentioned as one of the three most important ones. On the other hand, I calculated measures of kurtosis and skewness of the distribution of reputational scores among all the actors participating in the process.¹⁹ These measures indicate how much the distribution of reputation scores deviates from a normal distribution, that is how flat the distribution is and towards which side it tends.

The first aspect of the conflict dimension, the dominant conflict line (CLI), gets covered by the membership of a case in the set of decision-making structures with a perfect left-right conflict line. The negation of this set is a set with a perfect openness-traditions conflict line. The conflict line is measured by data on the convergence and divergence of actors' positions in the process. Interview partners were asked to mention the actors with whom they had diverging (coded as -1) or converging (coded as 1) views on the policy project in question, this based on a list comprising all actors participating in that process. The resulting data matrix was then analyzed with two different approaches to blockmodelling, a direct and an indirect one. With the indirect method, the program (UCINET, Borgatti *et al.* 2002) first calculates similarities of positions in the convergence/divergence profile of the actors and then clusters them, beginning with the most similar ones and ending up with two blocks of actors who's profiles are the most different from each other. With the direct method, the so-called “generalized blockmodelling”, the program (PAJEK, Batagelj and Mrvar 1996) directly rearranges the data matrix in order to find a solution that best fits the ideal structure of two opposing blocks (Doreian *et al.* 2005, Nooy *et al.* 2005). Both procedures identify the two groups of actors that most strongly oppose each other. The substantial content of the conflict line must then be interpreted from the actors that are part of the two opposing blocks. Additionally, to check for robustness of the results and to exclude non-important actors, both blockmodelling procedures were also performed on restricted networks containing only the core actors (gt 50% of reputation).

¹⁹ These measures were calculated for the “very influent actor”-scale as well as for the “three most influent actors”-scale.

Finally, the second aspect of conflict is the conflict level (CLE). It's score is defined by the membership of the cases in the set of decision-making structures with a very high conflict level. The negation of this set is a set with very low conflict. Indicators of conflict are the following: On the one hand, I calculated the average of convergent (1) and divergent (-1) relations in the network. On the other hand, I calculated the average of the relations between the two opposing blocks identified before.²⁰ Both indicators were calculated based on the whole network as well as on the restricted network containing only the core actors.

Table 1: Fuzzy values for conditions and outcomes

CASE	E	M	R	P	F	PD	DA	CLE	CLI
Pension	0	0.8	1	0.4	0.2	1	0.2	1	1
Budget	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.2	0	0.8	0.6	0.8
Savings	0.8	0.2	0	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.2
Persons	0.6	1	1	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.2
Schengen	0.8	0.8	1	0.2	0.4	0.6	1	0.6	0
Nuclear	0.2	0.6	1	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.4	1	1
Infrastructure	0	0.4	0	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.2	0.6
Foreigners	0.4	0.6	1	0.8	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.6	1
Telecom	0.6	0.4	0	0.4	0	0.8	0.2	0.6	0.8
Education	0.2	0.2	1	0.8	1	0.6	0	0	-
Fiscal equal.	0.2	0.4	1	1	1	0	0.6	0.6	0.8

4.3.2 Calibration of the conditions

The different criteria used for the calibration of the five conditions are the following. First, the degree of Europeanization (E) is defined by the case's membership in the set of fully Europeanized cases. The negated set is the one of fully domestic cases. Specific case knowledge is used to calibrate the cases. Second, the degree of media presence (M) is defined by the membership in the set of cases that are strongly present in the media, while the negation of this set is a set of cases not at all exposed to the media. This is measured with a proxy. From the interview data, I dispose of information about the intensity of the activities of the interviewed actors towards the media (press conferences, interviews, etc.) and about the importance of the public debate compared to the negotiations and lobbying in the decision-making institutions. Using this data, I assume that cases where actors were actively looking

²⁰ Note that this score was calculated based on the results only from the indirect blockmodelling procedure.

for media attention were actually more present in the media than acts where this was less the case. Third, the degree of federalism (F) is defined by the membership score in the set of fully federalist cases. Its negation is the set of fully non-federalist cases. Case knowledge out of documentary sources provides me with information on the intensity to which cantons competences are touched by the policy project. Fourth, the referendum condition (R) is simply coded 1 if a referendum took place and 0 if not. Fifth and finally, the openness of the pre-parliamentary phase (P) is covered by the case's membership in the set of cases with a very open pre-parliamentary phase. The negation is a set of cases with a very closed pre-parliamentary phase. Two indicators are taken into account. The first is the absolute number of access points for external, non-state actors. The second is the ratio of the number of stages that constitute access points over the total number of stages that the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process is composed of.

5 Analysis and results

5.1 Preliminary remarks

As mentioned in the introduction, the following QCA is but a first step in the process of dialogue between theoretical ideas and empirical evidence (Ragin 1987, 2000). As such, the results should be looked at with caution. The analysis must be further revised in order to be able to derive statements about necessary and sufficient set-relations that are highly consistent with the empirical evidence and cover a maximum of the instances of the outcome. It is thereby especially important to resolve contradictory configurations that still exist in the present data.²¹

The two aspects from each of the two dimensions of the decision-making structure will be analyzed separately. For each of the four analyses, only the factors for which there exist theoretical expectations are taken into account. The analyses were conducted with the software fsQCA (Ragin *et al.* 2009)²². The presence of the phenomenon and its absence are analyzed separately. Further, the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions must be separated and the former should precede the latter (Schneider and Wagemann 2007, Rihoux and Ragin 2008). Each result is accompanied by scores of consistency and coverage, which are measures for the strength of the empirical support for arguments specifying set-theoretic

²¹ Contradictory configurations are given when two cases display the same values of the different conditions in the truth table, but do not agree on the outcome.

²² The analysis of sufficient conditions was conducted using the Truth Table Algorithm.

connections (Ragin 2008: 44).²³ The minimization procedure of the truth tables produces three solutions, a parsimonious one, a complex one and an intermediate one. For lack of space, only the intermediate solutions will be presented and discussed in the paper.²⁴

In the present case, the analysis of necessary conditions reveals that for all of the 8 (four aspects plus their negations) outcomes, the highest consistency value for a necessary condition is 0.86 (Condition P for the outcome \sim PD). Especially given the relatively small number of cases, this value is too low to support the claim of necessity (see Schneider and Wagemann 2007: 213, 231ff.). Therefore, no necessary condition exists for any of the outcomes. Consequently, the following analyses only look for combinations of sufficient conditions for the outcomes.²⁵ The respective truth tables, showing which combinations are considered as consistent with the claim that a subset relation exists, can be found in appendix 2.

5.2 Power

First, I look at the two aspects of power and try to detect the causal paths that lead to the dominance of state or external actors and to a distribution or a concentration of power. The analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome DA, that is the dominance of state actors over external actors, results in the following solution:²⁶

$$DA \rightarrow \sim R \sim M \sim E + \sim F \sim PME \quad (\text{consistency} = .88 / \text{coverage} = .56).$$

The term means that there exist two different combinations of conditions that are connected to a decision-making structure dominated by state actors. A first one consists of a non-Europeanized policy, weak media presence and no referendum. Cases with strong membership in this combination are the program of budget relief or the infrastructure fund. A second, quite different combination of conditions is one of a Europeanized policy with strong

²³ Consistency indicates how closely a perfect subset relation is approximated. Like statistical significance, it signals whether an empirical connection merits the close attention of the investigator. Coverage assesses the degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome. Like statistical strength, it indicates the empirical relevance or importance of a set-theoretic connection. (Ragin 2008: 45).

²⁴ When minimizing the truth table, the program can make use of the logical remainders (combination of causes with no empirical observation due to limited diversity) in different ways. The parsimonious solution permits the incorporation of any logical remainder that contributes to the derivation of a logically simpler solution. The complex solution doesn't include any logical remainder at all. The intermediate solution makes only use of the so-called "easy" logical remainders, that is the ones that do not go against existing theoretical or substantial knowledge.

²⁵ The threshold for consistency of sufficient conditions should at least be .75. However, any major gap between the consistency scores closest to 1 and the others (still $\geq .75$) can serve as a threshold (Schneider and Wagemann 2007).

²⁶ Note that by convention, capital letters indicate the presence of a phenomenon. A capital letter preceded by a \sim indicates absence of a phenomenon. Two letters together represent a situation of logical "and". A + represents the logical "or" and thus separates two different paths to the outcome.

media presence, but a closed pre-parliamentary phase and a low level of federalism. A case with strong membership in this combination of conditions is the bilateral agreement on Schengen/Dublin. Note that the first solution is, from an empirical point of view, slightly more important than the second one. Thus, depending on the conditions with which they combine, both a Europeanized policy as well as a non-Europeanized policy can lead to state actors' dominance. The same is true for media presence. The effect of the other conditions is in the direction that was theoretically expected, but no condition alone is sufficient to cause a decision-making structure dominated by state actors.

Even three different combinations of conditions lead to the opposite outcome \sim DA, that is a decision-making structure dominated by external actors. The solution term for this outcome is:

$$\sim\text{DA} \rightarrow \text{R}(\text{M}\sim\text{E}+\text{PM}+\text{FP}\sim\text{E}) \quad (\text{consistency} = .86 / \text{coverage} = .68).$$

The solution reveals that the condition of the referendum is crucial when one wants to explain why external actors can play an important role in a decision-making structure. The existence of a referendum is part of all of the three combinations that are sufficient for the outcome \sim DA. This makes obviously sense, as the referendum is the most important institution in Swiss politics for external actors to oppose a legislative project. However, note that first, this does not mean that the referendum is necessary for external actors to dominate the decision-making structure. Second, the referendum alone is never sufficient for external actors to dominate a decision-making structure, but that at least two more conditions must be met. Three possibilities that combine with the referendum provoke the outcome \sim DA. These are first, media presence and the absence of Europeanization, second, media presence and an open pre-parliamentary phase, and third, the absence of Europeanization, an open pre-parliamentary phase and a high level of federalism of the issue. All of these solutions are of roughly the same empirical relevance. Cases that are strong members in the first combination are the pension reform, the law on nuclear energy and the new foreigners' law. Examples for the second possibility are the law on nuclear energy, the new foreigners' law or the bilateral treaty on the free movement of persons. A very federalist issue dominated by the cantons, the constitutional article on education, represents the third path to a decision-making structure dominated by external actors. Again, the solution revealed that all five conditions are somehow connected to the outcome \sim DA, and again, no single condition is enough to make sure that external actors dominate a decision-making structure. As part of their respective

combinations, the single factors however work the way they are supposed to based on theoretical argumentation.

The second aspect of power was defined as the distribution of power among the actors in the decision-making structure. The analysis of the truth table reveals that there exists only one combination of factors that can be regarded as sufficient for power to be largely distributed among actors. This solution is expressed by the term

$$PD \rightarrow \sim FRM \quad (\text{consistency} = .94 / \text{coverage} = .59).$$

The path that leads to a decision-making structure where power is distributed among several actors is conditioned by a non-federalist case with strong media presence and decided on in a referendum vote. The pension reform, the free movement of persons, the Schengen agreement, the law on nuclear energy and the new foreigners' law are strong members of this combinations' set. This result suggests two things. First, it seems that the conditions of Europeanization and of the pre-parliamentary phase are unimportant to explain why power in a given decision-making structure is distributed among several actors. Second, the finding reveals that there is only one specific causal path with three conditions for the outcome PD. This fits with earlier findings on Swiss politics, stating that in general, power is not largely distributed and a very small number of actors are able to really influence policy making in this country (Kriesi 1980).

The term of sufficiency for the opposite situation, a decision-making structure where power is concentrated in the hands of only very few actors, is the following:

$$\sim PD \rightarrow \sim R \sim M \sim E + ME \quad (\text{consistency} = .82 / \text{coverage} = .64).$$

Two different combinations of conditions are sufficient for a decision-making structure to be dominated by one or only very few actors. Both parts of the solution term have roughly the same empirical importance. The interesting thing is again, like in the causal chains leading to the domination of state actors, that the absence and the presence of the same factors play a role, depending on their specific combination. On the one hand, there are cases that are domestic, not mediatized and not subject to a referendum. Cases with strong membership in this combination of causes are the infrastructure fund and the program of budget relief. On the other hand, concentration of power is connected to the presence of Europeanization and the media. This is however a puzzling result as both cases with strong membership in this combination of conditions, that is the free movement of persons and the Schengen agreement, are not strong members in the set of cases with power concentration. This result needs to be revised.

5.3 Conflict

The second dimension of decision-making structures is conflict. First, I look at what factors are responsible for the nature of conflict, which is expressed by the dominant conflict line between the actors. The degree of Europeanization of the decision-making process is the only condition for which theoretical expectations concerning the nature of the conflict line exist. Consequently, I concentrate only on this factor.²⁷ Analysis reveals that the absence of this Europeanization is sufficient for a left-right conflict line to occur:

$$\text{CLI} \rightarrow \sim\text{E} \quad (\text{consistency} = .84 / \text{coverage} = .84).$$

This finding is of course very trivial. For the opposite outcome, that is the negation of the outcome ($\sim\text{CLI}$) and thus the presence of an openness-traditions conflict line, no condition or combination of conditions is sufficient. The empirical evidence is not consistent enough with the claim that Europeanization is sufficient for the existence of an openness-traditions conflict line. This result is caused by the case of the law on telecommunication. In fact, this is a case of indirect Europeanization, but it provokes a left-right conflict line. Generally, the outcome of the conflict line needs further examination. For instance, more factors need to be taken into account in order to shed light on the question of the conditions connected with a specific conflict line.

The second aspect of conflict is its intensity, the conflict level. The minimal term that expresses the sufficient condition for high conflict is

$$\text{CLE} \rightarrow \sim\text{FMR} \quad (\text{consistency} = .94 / \text{coverage} = .53).$$

Non-federalist cases with high media presence and in which a referendum takes place display high conflict levels. Instances with strong membership in this combination are the pension reform, the Schengen agreement, the law on nuclear energy and the new foreigners' law. Note that interestingly, this combination of conditions is exactly the same that was already identified to be connected with the outcome of a large distribution of power. However, the two phenomena do of course not always co-occur. While the term above only expresses sufficiency, there can still be other, and different, combinations of conditions that lead to either high conflict or distribution of power. Again, the fact that only one combination of conditions is sufficient for high conflict fits with earlier findings and with the general idea that in Swiss politics, high conflict is rather rare (see FN 5). At the same time, it seems that two

²⁷ Note that the case of the new constitutional article on education was taken out of the cases analyzed concerning their conflict line. In fact, this case does not display any conflict line that makes sense, given the fact that all actors agreed on the final solution.

factors for which there exist theoretical arguments about their influence on the level of conflict, Europeanization and the pre-parliamentary phase, are not responsible for the outcome CLE. That means that their absence is not automatically associated with high conflict, contrary to what was expected by theory.

The last outcome for which a solution term containing sufficient conditions needs to be presented is the negation of high conflict. This is the situation of a decision-making structure with no or low conflict among the actors. This solution term is:

$$\sim\text{CLE} \rightarrow \sim\text{M}\sim\text{R}(\text{E}+\text{PF}) \quad (\text{consistency} = .91 / \text{coverage} = .40).$$

It suggests that two causal paths to low conflict exist. The two sufficient combinations share two conditions, that is low media presence and no referendum. This finding underlines the link between conflict and the referendum on the one hand and media presence on the other hand. However, the absence of these factors is not sufficient to avoid conflict. More conditions need to combine with low media presence and the absence of a referendum. The two factors have to be combined either with a high degree of Europeanization or with an open pre-parliamentary phase and a federal policy. A case with strong membership in the first set is the bilateral agreement on the taxation of savings. An example for the second combination is the law on the infrastructure fund. Both of these possible combinations cover roughly the same amount of the instances of the outcome. The finding again reveals the importance of taking into account all the five conditions for the explanation of low conflict. All the effects are in the suspected direction.

6 Conclusion

This paper describes, compares and attempts to explain the decision-making structures in 11 different decision-making processes in Switzerland that went through parliament between 2001 and 2006. Decision-making structures describe the specific form that a policy network takes. They are important because of their consequences on the policy output of a process. Decision-making structures consist of two dimensions, namely power and conflict. Five factors, that is Europeanization, media presence, federalism, the referendum and the structure of the pre-parliamentary phase, were taken into account for the explanation of two aspects of each of the two dimensions of decision-making structures.

The first objective of the paper was the explanation of the decision-making structures by the factors cited above. The main conclusions concerning this objective are the following: First, there exists no single necessary condition for any of the aspects that were examined. This is a

strong indication of equifinality, that is the existence of several causal paths leading to the same outcome. Additionally, the analyses of sufficiency revealed that in most cases, more than one combination of conditions is sufficient for an outcome. Second, all the results, except the one for the conflict line, suggest that a combination of at least two conditions is needed in order for it to be sufficient for the outcome. This reveals a phenomenon of conjunctural causation, thus a situation where different factors interact and jointly produce the outcome. Third, and more substantially, all the five factors played a role for the explanation of decision-making structures. However, remember that this QCA does not display final, corroborated results, but is only a first step in the dialogue between theoretical ideas and empirical evidence. Concerning the second, methodological objective, this paper shows clearly how complementary SNA and QCA are and how useful such a combination can be. Social Network Analysis, on the one hand, is a strong tool to precisely describe phenomena such as decision-making structures, but it has no explanatory power per se. QCA, on the other hand, depends on substantive case knowledge and thick description as a basis for the systematic comparison of the cases.

Of course, the present version of the paper has a certain number of weaknesses and limitations. First, it is clear that the QCA must be revised. Closer examination of the cases can reveal details that influence the calibration. The inclusion of more theoretical factors may allow to find more fine-grained and consistent explanations for the different outcomes. And finally, the application of a two-step procedure is able to take into account the underlying structure of the influence factors and thereby to reduce the number of logical remainders (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, Schneider and Wagemann 2007: 256ff.). Second, concerning the cases under study, this analysis is of course limited to the most important decision-making processes. It can not automatically be claimed that the findings are valid for the whole range of decision-making processes in Switzerland at the beginning of the 21st century, or for other periods or other countries. This should be evaluated taking into account the specificities of the political system. The present paper delivered some elements that allow us to better understand the causal mechanisms between a decision-making structure and its context.

References

- ATKINSON, Michael M., and William D. COLEMAN. 1989. "Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies." *British Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 1: 47-67.
- BATAGELJ, Vladimir, and Andrej MRVAR. 1996. *PAJEK - Program for Large Network Analysis*.
- BLUMLER, Jay G., and Dennis KAVANAGH. 1996. "The Third Age of Political Communication: Influences and Features." *Political Communication* 16: 209-230.
- BORGATTI, S.P., M.G. EVERETT, and L.C. FREEMAN. 2002. *Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.
- BÖRZEL, Tanja A., and Thomas RISSE. 2003. "Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe." In *The Politics of Europeanisation*, edited by Kevin FEATHERSTONE and Claudio RADAELLI. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- BRAUN, Dietmar. 2000. "Territorial Division of Power and Public Policy-Making: An Overview." In *Public Policy and Federalism*, edited by Dietmar BRAUN. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- . 2003. "Dezentraler und unitarischer Föderalismus. Die Schweiz und Deutschland im Vergleich." *Swiss Political Science Review* 9, no. 1: 57-89.
- BRUNNER, Matthias, and Pascal SCIARINI. 2002. "L'opposition ouverture-traditions." In *Changements de valeurs et nouveaux clivages politiques en Suisse*, edited by Simon HUG and Pascal SCIARINI. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- CARRINGTON, Peter J., John SCOTT, and Stanley WASSERMAN. 2005. *Models and Methods in Social Network Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- CHRISTOPOULOS, Dimitrios C. 2008. "The Governance of Networks: Heuristic or Formal Analysis? A Reply to Rachel Parker." *Political Studies* 56: 475-481.
- DAHL, Robert A. 1961. *Who Governs - Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- DANIELIAN, Lucig H., and Benjamin I. PAGE. 1994. "The Heavenly Chorus: Interest Group Voices on TV News." *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 4.
- DAUGBJERG, Carsten, and David MARSH. 1998. "Explaining policy outcomes: integrating the policy network approach with macro-level and micro-level analysis." In *Comparing Policy Networks*, edited by David MARSH. Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- DOREIAN, Patrick, Vladimir BATAGELJ, and Anuska FERLIGOJ. 2005. *Generalized Blockmodelling, Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- DOWDING, Keith. 1995. "Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach." *Political Studies* 43, no. 1: 136-158.
- . 2001. "There Must Be End to Confusion: Political Networks, Intellectual Fatigue, and the Need for Political Science Methods Courses in British Universities." *Political Studies* 49: 89-105.
- FISCHER, Alex. 2005. *Die Auswirkung der Internationalisierung und Europäisierung auf Schweizer Entscheidungsprozesse*. Zürich / Chur: Verlag Rüegger.
- FISCHER, Alex, Pascal SCIARINI, and Sarah NICOLET. 2003. "La politique des télécommunications suisse: entre pression internationale et résistance nationale." *Politiques et Management Public* 21, no. 3: 1-16.
- GERMANN, Raimund E. 2002. "Die Kantone: Gleichheit und Disparität." In *Handbuch der Schweizer Politik*, edited by Ulrich KLÖTI, Peter KNOEPFEL, Hanspeter KRIESI, Wolf LINDER and Yannis PAPADOPOULOS. Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
- GERMANN, Raimund E., Andreas FRUTIGER, and Monica von SURY. 1985. *Experts et commissions de la Confédération*. Lausanne: Presse polytechniques romandes.
- GOERTZ, Gary. 2006. *Social Science Concepts - A User's Guide*. Princeton / Woodstock: Princeton University Press.
- HALL, Peter. 2003. "Aligning ontology and methodology in comparative research." In *Comparative-historical analysis in the social sciences*, edited by James MAHONEY and Dietrich RUESCHENMEYER. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- HÄUSERMANN, Silja, André MACH, and Yannis PAPADOPOULOS. 2004. "From Corporatism to Partisan Politics: Social Policy Making under Strain in Switzerland." *Swiss Political Science Review* 10, no. 2: 33-59.
- HAVERLAND, Markus. 2007. "Methodology." In *Europeanization - New Research Agendas*, edited by Maartens P. VINK and Paolo GRAZIANO. New York: Palgram Macmillian.
- HECLO, Hugh. 1974. *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
- JÖNSSON, Christer, Bo BJURULF, Ole ELGSTRÖM, Anders SANNERSTEDT, and Maria STRÖMVIK. 1998. "Negotiations in Networks in the European Union." *International Negotiations* 3: 319-344.
- KATZENSTEIN, Peter. 1978. *Between Power and Plenty. Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- . 1984. *Corporatism and change : Austria, Switzerland, and the politics of industry*. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
- . 1985. *Small States in World Markets*. Cornell: Cornell University Press.
- KNILL, Christoph, and Dirk LEHMKUHL. 2002. "The national impact of European Union regulatory policy: Three Europeanization mechanisms." *European Journal of Political Research* 41: 255-280.
- KNOKE, David. 1990. *Political Networks - The Structural Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1993. "Networks of Elite Structure and Decision Making." *Sociological Methods & Research* 22, no. 1: 22-45.
- KNOKE, David, Franz Urban PAPPI, Jeffrey BROADBENT, and Yutaka TSUJINAKA. 1996. *Comparing Policy Networks - Labor Politics in the U.S., Germany, and Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- KÖNIG, Thomas, and Thomas BRÄUNINGER. 1998. "The Formation of Policy Networks: Preferences, Institutions and Actors' Choice of Information and Exchange Relations." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 10, no. 4: 445-471.
- KRIESI, Hanspeter. 1980. *Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- . 1994. *Les démocraties occidentales*. Paris: Economica.
- . 1998. "The transformation of cleavage politics: The 1997 Stein Rokkan lecture." *European Journal of Political Research* 33: 165-185.
- . 2007. *Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. Teil 1: Grundlagen, Studienkurs Politikwissenschaft*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- KRIESI, Hanspeter, and Maya JEGEN. 2001. "The Swiss energy policy elite: The actor constellation of a policy domain in transition." *European Journal of Political Research* 39: 251-287.
- KRIESI, Hanspeter, and Alexander H. TRECHSEL. 2008. *The Politics of Switzerland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- KRIESI, Hanspeter, Silke ADAM, and Margit JOCHUM. 2006a. "Comparative analysis of policy networks in Western Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 3: 341-361.
- KRIESI, Hanspeter, Edgar GRANDE, Romain LACHAT, Martin DOLEZAL, Simon BORNSCHIER, and Timotheos FREY. 2006b. "Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared." *European Journal of Political Research* 45: 921-956.
- . 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- LAUMANN, Edward O., and Franz Urban PAPPI. 1976. *Networks of Collective Action: A Perspective on Community Influence Systems*. New York: Academic Press.
- LAUMANN, Edward O., and David KNOKE. 1987. *The Organizational State - Social Choice in National Policy Domains*. Madison/London: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- LIJPHART, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- LINDER, Wolf. 2005. *Schweizerische Demokratie*. Bern / Stuttgart / Wien: Haupt.

- LIPSET, Seymour Martin, and Stein ROKKAN. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- MACH, André, Silja HÄUSERMANN, and Yannis PAPADOPOULOS. 2003. "Economic regulatory reforms in Switzerland: adjustments without European integration, or how rigidities become flexible." *Journal of European Public Policy* 10, no. 2: 301-318.
- MAGETTI, Martino. 2009. "The Role of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Policy-Making: A Comparative Analysis." *Journal of European Public Policy* forthcoming.
- MARSH, David, and Martin SMITH. 2000. "Understanding Policy Networks: towards a Dialectical Approach." *Political Studies* 48: 4-21.
- . 2001. "There is More than One Way to Do Political Science: On Different Ways to Study Policy Networks." *Political Studies* 49, no. 3: 528-541.
- MAZZOLENI, Gianpietro, and Winfried SCHULZ. 1999. "'Mediatization' of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?" *Political Communication* 16: 247-261.
- MORAVCSIK, Andrew. 1994. *Why the European Community strengthens the state: Domestic politics and international cooperation*. Vol. Working Paper 52, Working Paper 52. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- MORSE, Janice M. 2003. "Principles of Mixed Methods and Multimethod Research Design." In *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research*, edited by Abbas TASHAKKORI and Charles TEDDLIE. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- NEIDHART, Leonhard. 1970. *Plebiszit und Pluralitäre Demokratie, eine Analyse der Funktionen des schweizerischen Gesetzesreferendum*. Bern: Francke.
- NICOLET, Sarah, Pascal SCIARINI, and Alex FISCHER. 2003. *Seeking Consensus: A quantitative analysis of decision-making processes in Switzerland*. Lausanne: IDHEAP.
- NOOY, Wouter de, Andrej MRVAR, and Vladimir BATAGELJ. 2005. *Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- POITRY, Alain-Valéry. 1989. *La fonction d'ordre de l'État. Analyse des mécanismes et des déterminants sélectifs dans le processus législatif suisse*. Bern: Lang.
- RADAELLI, Claudio M. 2003. "The Europeanization of Public Policy." In *The Politics of Europeanization*, edited by Kevin FEATHERSTONE and Claudio RADAELLI. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- RAGIN, Charles, Kriss A. DRASS, and Sean DAVEY. 2009. "Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 2.5."
- RAGIN, Charles C. 1987. *The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2000. *Fuzzy-set social science*. Chicago: The University of Chicago press.
- . 2008. *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy-Sets and Beyond*. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
- RIEGER, Günter. 1995. "Rassismus." In *Lexikon der Politik - Politische Theorien*, edited by Dieter NOHLEN and Rainer-Olaf SCHULTZE. Frankfurt am Main: Büchergilde Gutenberg.
- RIHOUX, Benoît, and Charles C. RAGIN. 2008. *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*. Thousand Oaks/London: SAGE Publications.
- SABATIER, Paul A. 1987. "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change: An Advocacy Coalition Framework." *Science Communication* 8: 649-692.
- . 2006. "Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)." In *Dictionnaire des politiques publiques*, edited by Laurie BOUSSAGUET, Sophie JACQUOT and Pauline RAVINET. Paris: Sciences po les presses.
- SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E.E. 1960. *The Semi-Sovereign People*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- SCHMIDT, Vivien A. 2006. "Procedural democracy in the EU: the Europeanization of national and sectoral policy-making processes." *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 5: 670-691.
- SCHMITTER, Philippe C. 2009. "The nature and future of comparative politics." *European Political Science Review* 1, no. 1: 33-61.

- SCHNEIDER, Carsten, and Claudius WAGEMANN. 2006. "Reducing Complexity in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Remote and Proximate Factors and the Consolidation of Democracy." *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no. 5.
- SCHNEIDER, Carsten Q., and Claudius WAGEMANN. 2007. *Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) und Fuzzy Sets. Ein Lehrbuch für Anwender und solche, die es werden wollen.* . Opladen/Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich.
- SCHNEIDER, Volker. 1992. "The structure of policy networks." *European Journal of Political Research* 21: 109-129.
- SCIARINI, Pascal. 1994. *La Suisse face à la Communauté Européenne et au GATT - Le cas test de la politique agricole*. Genève: Editions Georg.
- . 1995. "Réseau politique interne et négociations internationales: le GATT, levier e la réforme agricole suisse." *Swiss Political Science Review* 1, no. 2-3: 225-252.
- . 1996. "Elaboration of the Swiss Agricultural Policy for the GATT Negotiations: A Network Analysis." *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 22, no. 1: 85-115.
- . 2005. "Le centralisme et les pouvoirs cantonaux: quelles évolutions?" In *Fédéralisme et centralisation. L'expérience suisse et les nouveaux défis européens*, edited by Oscar MAZZOLENI. Lugano: Casagrande.
- . 2006. "Le processus législatif." In *Handbuch der Schweizer Politik*, edited by Ulrich KLÖTI, Peter KNOEPFEL, Hanspeter KRIESI, Wolf LINDER, Yannis PAPADOPOULOS and Pascal SCIARINI. Zürich: Verlag NZZ.
- SCIARINI, Pascal, and Alexandre TRECHSEL. 1996. "Démocratie directe en Suisse: l'élite politique victime des droits populaires?" *Swiss Political Science Review* 2, no. 2: 204-240.
- SCIARINI, Pascal, and Daniel BOCHSLER. 2006. "Réforme du fédéralisme suisse: contribution, promesses et limites de la collaboration intercantonale." In *Contributions à l'action publique*, edited by Jean-Louis CHAPPELET. Lausanne/Bern: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes/Haupt (co-édition).
- SCIARINI, Pascal, and Uwe SERDÜLT. 2006. "The Swiss decision-making system in the 21. century: power, institutions, conflicts." *Project design submitted to the Swiss National Foundation*.
- SCIARINI, Pascal, Sarah NICOLET, and Alex FISCHER. 2002. "L'impact de l'internationalisation sur les processus de décision en Suisse: Une analyse quantitative des actes législatifs 1995-1999." *Swiss Political Science Review* 8, no. 3/4: 1-34.
- SCIARINI, Pascal, Alex FISCHER, and Sarah NICOLET. 2004. "How Europe hits home: evidence from the Swiss case." *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 3: 353-378.
- SKOCPOL, Theda. 1985. "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research." In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. EVANS, Dietrich RUESCHEMEYER and Theda SKOCPOL. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SPREITZER, Astrid, and Sakura YAMASAKI. 2008. "Comparing Policy Networks: Policy Network Typology Building and Hypotheses Testing with QCA." In *Applications of Social Network Analysis ASNA 2005*, edited by Uwe SERDÜLT and Volker TÄUBE. Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.
- STEVENSON, William B., and Danna GREENBERG. 2000. "Agency and Social Networks: Strategies of Action in a Social Structure of Position, Opposition, and Opportunity." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 45: 651-678.
- TASHAKKORI, Abbas, and Charles TEDDLIE. 1998. *Mixed Methodology: Combining qualitative and quantiative approaches*. Thoasand Oaks, SA: Sage.
- THOMAS, Clive S. 2001. *Political Parties and Interest Groups: Shaping Democratic Governance*. Boulder/London: Lyenne Rienner.
- TRESCH, Anke. 2008. *Öffentlichkeit und Sprachenvielfalt - Medienvermittelte Kommunikation zur Europapolitik in der Deutsch - und Westschweiz*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.
- VATTER, Adrian. 2006. "Die Kantone." In *Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, 4. Auflage*, edited by U. KLÖTI, P. KNOEPFEL, H.-P. KRIESI, W. LINDER, I. PAPADOPOULOS and P. SCIARINI. Zürich: Verlag NZZ.
- WAARDEN, Frans VAN. 1992. "Dimensions and types of policy networks." *European Journal of Political Research* 21: 29-52.

- WASSERMAN, Stanley, and Katherine FAUST. 1994. *Social Network Analysis. Methods and Applications*. Cambridge.
- WEISS, Ulrich. 1996. "Macht." In *Lexikon der Politik - Politische Theorien*, edited by Dieter NOHLEN and Rainer-Olaf SCHULTZE. Frankfurt am Main: Büchergilde Gutenberg.
- WOLFSFELD, Gadi. 1997. *Media and Political Conflict. News from the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Appendix 1: Raw data used for the calibration of the outcome

a) Dominant actor (DA)

CASE	GT 50% (core)				GT 75%				Average influence	Average 3 most influent	Part-of-the-sum influence	the-sum 3 most influent
	State	Party	IG	Canton	State	Party	IG	Canton				
Pension	31	31	38	0	30	40	30	0	Party	State	IG	IG
Budget	33	44	11	11	67	0	0	33	Party	State	State	State
Savings	56	11	22	11	67	0	33	0	State	State	State	State
Persons	36	29	36	0	20	40	40	0	IG	IG	State	IG
Schengen	50	25	13	13	100	0	0	0	Cantons	State	State	State
Nuclear	28	28	39	6	40	20	40	0	Cantons	State	IG	IG
Infrastructure	41	18	24	18	33	0	67	0	State	State	State	State
Foreigners	30	40	20	10	43	57	0	0	Party	State	Party	State
Telecom	25	25	50	0	29	57	17	0	Party	Party	IG	IG
Education	31	23	8	31	0	50	0	50	Cantons	Cantons	Cantons	Cantons
Fiscal equal.	20	30	20	30	67	0	0	33	Other	State	State	State

b) Power distribution (DP)

CASE	N of actors (reputation gt 50%)	N of actors (reputation gt 75%)	N of actors (3 most influent)	Kurtosis (Influence)	Skewness (Influence)	Kurtosis (3 most influent)	Skewness (3 most influent)
Pension	13	10	22	-0.21	1.11	-0.85	0.87
Budget	9	3	16	1.65	1.60	0.06	1.23
Savings	9	3	22	-0.51	0.64	2.98	1.92
Persons	14	5	22	-1.07	0.71	0.89	1.41
Schengen	16	3	27	-1.32	0.41	1.10	1.44
Nuclear	18	5	26	-1.10	0.61	2.95	1.82
Infrastructure	17	3	25	-1.05	-0.07	10.63	2.95
Foreigners	10	7	20	0.12	1.18	1.71	1.62
Telecom	16	7	19	-1.49	0.31	5.94	2.37
Education	13	6	21	-0.98	0.50	8.55	2.64
Fiscal equal.	10	3	15	0.11	0.97	-0.34	1.11

c) Conflict lines (CLI)

CASE	Block-modeling (all)		Block-modeling (core)	
	Block 1	Block 2	Block 1	Block 2
Pension	SP,Grüne,SGB, Unia, Travail.Suisse	FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO,SAV,SGV, Alliance F	SP,SGB,Travail.Suisse	FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO,SAV,SGV
Budget	SVP,FDP,CVP, ECO,SAV, SGV	SP,Grüne,SGB,Travail.Suisse ,VGB,transfair,SBV	SP	FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO
Savings	SVP	FDP,CVP,SP,Grüne,ECO,SGV ,SBVg,Swissholdings,Travail. Suisse		SBVg, Economiesuisse, FDP
Persons	SVP	FDP,CVP,SP,Grüne,ECO,SAV ,SGV,SBV,SGB,Travail.Suisse	SVP	FDP,CVP,SP,Grüne,ECO,SAV ,SGV,SGB,Travail.Suisse
Schengen	SVP	SP,CVP,FDP,Grüne,ECO, Travail.Suisse	SVP	FDP,SP,CVP,ECO
Nuclear	SP,Grüne,SGB	CVP,FDP,SVP,ECO,SGV	SP,Grüne	FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO
Infrastructure	SVP,(FDP),(TCS)	SP,Grüne,CVP,SGB,VCS, (TCS),(FDP)		CVP,SP,FDP,TCS
Foreigners	SP,Grüne,SGB,Travail.Suisse	SVP,FDP,CVP,SBV,SGV, SAV	SP,SGB	SVP,FDP,CVP,SAV
Telecom	SP,SGB,Swisscom,Gew. Kommunikation,(SVP)	FDP,CVP,ECO,ASUT,Sunrise, (SVP)	SP,Swisscom,Gew. Kommunikation,(SVP)	FDP,CVP,ECO,ASUT,Sunrise, (SVP)
Education	(SVP)	FDP,SP,CVP,Grüne,ECO,SGB, (SVP)		FDP,SP,CVP,ECO
Fiscal equal.	SP,IGsozNFA,(Grüne),(SGB)	CVP,FDP,SVP,ECO,(Grüne), (SGB)	SP,IGsozNFA	CVP,FDP
This table reports only the most important parties and interest groups.				
Divergent results between direct and indirect blockmodeling are indicated with brackets.				

d) Conflict level (CLE)

CASE	Average all	Average bw coalitions (all)	Average core	Average bw coalitions (core)
Pension	-0.04	-0.33	-0.10	-0.55
Budget	0.01	-0.24	0.30	-0.63
Savings	0.23	-0.11	0.47	0.16
Persons	0.11	-0.37	0.37	-0.85
Schengen	0.11	-0.53	0.22	-0.67
Nuclear	-0.02	-0.48	-0.09	-0.69
Infrastructure	0.18	-0.03	0.21	0.01
Foreigners	0.05	-0.30	0.13	-0.64
Telecom	0.05	-0.25	0.08	-0.35
Education	0.18	0.41	0.34	0.41
Fiscal equal.	0.04	-0.10	-0.04	-0.45

Appendix 2: Truth tables

a) Outcome DA

CASE	E	M	R	P	F	DA	Consistency
Infrastructure	0	0	0	1	1	1	1.00
Budget	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.89
Schengen	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.86
Persons	1	1	1	1	0	0	0.71
Education, Fiscal Equal.	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.67
Telecom, Savings	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.67
Nuclear, Foreigners	0	1	1	1	0	0	0.64
Pension	0	1	1	0	0	0	0.63

b) Outcome ~DA

CASE	E	M	R	P	F	~DA	Consistency
Nuclear, Foreigners	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.91
Pension	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.88
Persons	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.86
Education, Fiscal Equal.	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.83
Telecom, Savings	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.67
Infrastructure	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.60
Schengen	1	1	1	0	0	0	0.57
Budget	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.56

c) Outcome PD

CASE	E	M	R	P	F	PD	Consistency
Schengen	1	1	1	0	0	1	1.00
Nuclear, Foreigners	0	1	1	1	0	1	1.00
Persons	1	1	1	1	0	1	1.00
Pension	0	1	1	0	0	1	1.00
Education, Fiscal Equal.	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.67
Telecom, Savings	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.67
Infrastructure	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.60
Budget	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.56

d) Outcome ~PD

CASE	E	M	R	P	F	~PD	Consistency
Infrastructure	0	0	0	1	1	1	1.00
Budget	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.89
Persons	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.86
Schengen	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.86
Education, Fiscal Equal.	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.75
Telecom, Savings	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.67
Nuclear, Foreigners	0	1	1	1	0	0	0.64
Pension	0	1	1	0	0	0	0.63

e) Outcome CLI

CASE	E	CLI	Consistency
Pension, Nuclear, Foreigners, Education, Fiscal Equil., Infrastructure, Budget	0	1	0.84
Persons, Schengen, Savings, Telecom	1	0	0.50

f) Outcome ~CLI

CASE	E	~CLI	Consistency
Persons, Schengen, Savings, Telecom	1	0	0.72
Pension, Nuclear, Foreigners, Education, Fiscal Equil., Infrastructure, Budget	0	0	0.28

g) Outcome CLE

CASE	E	M	R	P	F	CLE	Consistency
Persons	1	1	1	1	0	1	1.00
Schengen	1	1	1	0	0	1	1.00
Pension	0	1	1	0	0	1	1.00
Nuclear, Foreigners	0	1	1	1	0	1	1.00
Budget	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.78
Telecom, Savings	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.67
Education, Fiscal Equal.	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.67
Infrastructure	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.60

h) Outcome ~CLE

CASE	E	M	R	P	F	~CLE	Consistency
Infrastructure	0	0	0	1	1	1	1.00
Telecom, Savings	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.83
Budget	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.78
Schengen	1	1	1	0	0	0	0.71
Persons	1	1	1	1	0	0	0.71
Education, Fiscal Equal.	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.67
Pension	0	1	1	0	0	0	0.50
Nuclear, Foreigners	0	1	1	1	0	0	0.45